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In 1992, the U.S.-backed Salvadoran military and the leftist guerillas signed the 
Chapultepec Peace Accords which put an end to a 12-year civil war that resulted in 75,000 
deaths, 9,000 forced disappearances and half a million internal displacements. Around 85% of 
the reports made by survivors of the civil war attributed the violence they experienced to state 
agents, paramilitary groups and death squads1. In a ‘postwar’ era, militarization of El Salvador 
has remained an institutional open wound. In 2008, the right-wing ARENA2 party signed a 
decree that established the participation of members of the Fuerza Armada de El Salvador 
(FAES) in civil security. In 2009, six months after the historic victory of the leftist Farabundo 
Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), the recently elected President Mauricio Funes (2009-
2014) signed a decree that established the continuation of joint police-military task forces in 
public security. Around this time, the military budget and funding increased in conjunction with 
more frequent reports of abuse of authority and human rights violations by the police and 
military. This institutional collaboration between the FAES and the Policía Nacional Civil (PNC) 
was justified under the notion that “the Armed Force will support the national police [in the 
1 Roberto D'Aubuisson, School of the Americas (SOA) graduate, co-founded the dead squads. In 1981, he founded 
the right-wing ARENA party and became its first leader. After transnational activist and political mobilization, the 
SOA changed its name to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Operation (WHINSEC). WHINSEC 
continues to train soldiers worldwide in counterinsurgency tactics which include torture, disappearances, and 
assassinations.  
2 Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance)  
v 
event that] the resources and efforts of the police are insufficient to reduce crime.”3 Despite this 
haunting legacy of a repressive Salvadoran military and the antagonistic history the military has 
had with revolutionary leftist groups, the FMLN government has relied on joint police-military 
task forces to ensure public security, and paradoxically, promote civil security and ‘peace.’ That 
the FMLN has re-ignited the FAES in public security is a contradiction. My thesis will discuss 
this paradox that speaks to the larger economic and societal structures that uphold militarization 
in El Salvador.  
Keywords: Central America, Postwar El Salvador, Militarization, Police Violence, Peaceful 
War, FMLN, Extraordinary Measures  
3 See Decree No. 60 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Abnormal Normality of Militarized Policing: The 
Increase of Violence in El Salvador and its Causes 
____________________________________________________ 
 
Scholars in the social sciences have theorized violence as an attempt to understand and 
explain tensions among individuals and collectives. For instance, one eminent scholar in 
anthropology, Phillipe Bourgois, distinguished between four types of violence, specifically 
structural, political, symbolic, and everyday violence. Johan Galtung’s structural violence 
(1969), rooted in the schools of thoughts of anti-colonialism and black liberation (Fanon 1961) 
and Catholic liberation theology (Sobrino 1995) in Latin America, pertain to the political and 
economic organization of society that creates the conditions for political violence, poverty, and 
exploitation (of the people and natural resources) to exist, thus generating ‘physical and 
emotional distress’ (Bourgois 2001). Political violence, according to Bourgois is “directly and 
purposefully administered in the name of a political ideology, movement, or state such as the 
physical repression of dissent by the army or the police as well as its converse, popular armed 
struggle against a repressive regime” (2001). Historically, political violence has been sponsored 
by nation-states and executed among society through the everyday use of coercion to attain 
political means. Everyday violence, as suggested by Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1992, 1996, 1997), 
sheds light to the “‘peace-time crimes,’ the ‘small wars and invisible genocides’ that plague the 
poor around the world” (Bourgois 2001). This type of violence works in the micro-level and 
constitutes the routine, daily practices of violence and violent intrapersonal interactions which 
result in the normalization of terror. In a like manner, Jesuit psychologist Ignacio Martín-Baró 
stressed that the normalization of violence could be conceived as a “normal abnormality,” 
specifically when referring to chronic burdens and difficulties (Martín-Baró 1994 qtd in 
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Menjívar 2011). In the context of political violence and its everyday manifestations, normal 
abnormality is a term used to express the process whereby the abnormal social relations caused 
by violence become normal and accepted as de facto solutions to ideological differences and 
social tension.  
 
"The most potent weapon in the hands of the oppressor  
is the mind of the oppressed.” 
Steve Biko 
 
While Bourgois posed that there are four types of violence, I would argue that all these 
types of violence are guided by ideology, particularly one that seeks to create submissive bodies 
and systems of domination and oppression. Namely, symbolic violence facilitates systems of 
domination because both the oppressor and oppressed uphold such systems. Following 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (2004), one can define symbolic violence as the internalization of 
oppression (i.e. hierarchies, inequality) by the dominated, through a process of misrecognition, 
which becomes rationalized, legitimized, and materialized with the consent of the dominated. “In 
this conceptualization,” sociologist Cecilia Menjívar notes, “‘the dominated apply categories 
constructed from the point of view of the dominant to the relations of domination, thus making it 
appear as natural. This can lead to systematic self-depreciation, even self-denigration’” 
(Bourdieu 2004 qtd. in Menjívar 2011). In other words, the oppressed agent is complicit in his or 
her own oppression. In a like manner, a similar conception of how differentials of power 
permeate the social sphere was pioneered by Marxist philosopher, Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci 
defined hegemony as “a socio-political situation in which the philosophy and practice of a 
society fuse or are in equilibrium; an order in which a certain way of life and thought is 
dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused throughout society in all its institutional 
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and private manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality, customs, religious and 
political principles, and all social relations” (Gramsci qtd. in Leiva 2016). This reference to 
hegemony suggests that power is gained not just through violence and coercion (the use of 
force), but also ideologically through consent, or permission from the dominated to be oppressed. 
In other words, hegemony is a socio-political and cultural process whereby the oppressed 
identifies and complies with the demands of the oppressors, and help maintain the status quo; 
thus, contributing to her or his own oppression. Arguably, all four types of violence, as suggested 
by Bourgois, are present in the history of war and peaceful war in El Salvador. Throughout my 
thesis, I maintain that a ‘peaceful war’ refers to the war-like violence existent in ‘postwar’ El 
Salvador, as well as its manifestations through U.S. influence toward dehumanization and 
militarized policing.  
As previously stated, even though all four forms of violence have been present in the 
history of El Salvador, I will only focus on state violence for the purpose of this thesis. But first, 
I will briefly lay the foundation in which state violence has found its expressions in Salvadoran 
society: structural violence. Structural violence functions at the macro level. Notably, although 
exploitation and poverty had existed in El Salvador before the 1960s and 1970s, these were 
decades when the domination led by the oligarchic-military dictatorship was unbearable for the 
poor sectors of society. These conditions of extreme poverty led to the organization of popular 
movements who sought to end the oppression of the capitalist ruling class and U.S. imperialism 
over the region. However, any act of dissent against the ruling class was faced with repression; 
but in response, the repression led to the formation of armed popular movements, including 
the Fuerzas Populares de Liberación Farabundo Martí (FPL), Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo 
(ERP), Resistencia Nacional (RN), Partido Comunista Salvadoreño (PCS), and Partido 
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Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos (PRTC)––who in 1980 unified to fight 
under the vanguard of the Frente Farabundo Martín para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN). 
Consequently, El Salvador underwent a civil war which was fought between the U.S.-backed 
military and the leftist FMLN guerrillas between 1980 and 1992. The civil war resulted in 75,000 
casualties. During this period, the United States trained Salvadorans soldiers at the School of the 
Americas (Gill 2004) and sent 6 billion US dollars in aid (Abrego 2014) to strengthen the 
military and repress popular uprisings or the potential of such. In this previous example, 
structural violence was articulated as the domination of the capitalist land-owning oligarchy 
whose interest were backed by state apparatuses such as the military and the police. Notably, the 
United States played a role in maintaining the domination of various sectors of Salvadoran 
society for they benefited greatly from the oppression of working-class Salvadorans as well as 
U.S. economic and political domination of the Central American region.  
In 1992, both the military and the FMLN guerrillas signed the Chapultepec Peace 
Accords in Mexico. By the end of the civil war, in addition to the 75,000 casualties, 9,000 were 
forcibly disappeared (Portillo 2000, 249), half a million were internally displaced, and “for the 
first time in Salvadoran history, people migrated en masse to the United States” (Abrego 2014). 
1992 was a year that marked a historic transition from an armed conflict to ‘democracy’ and 
‘peace.’ For the first time in the history of the country, people could vote for leaders that came 
from their struggles and represented their interests. However, the move toward democratization 
did not necessarily put an end to structural problems. Even though the country established a 
democratic nation-state, many believe that the peace accords did not transform the socio-
economic conditions that generated the civil war in the first place. Indeed, poverty and violence 
are still relevant today. As a matter of fact, since the signing of the peace accords, at least 90,594 
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people have violently lost their lives (see Table X). Based on these statistics on post-war 
casualties, arguably the 75,000 casualties during the 12-year period of the civil war have been 
surpassed by a 26-year period of a ‘peaceful democracy.’ Precisely, my analysis of state violence 
and human rights abuses is contextualized within this postwar period, distinctly post-2016 when 
the extraordinary measures were implemented as the leading public security legislature. The 
conceptualization of violence in times of ‘peace’ is important for it highlights that the systems of 
oppression and domination that existed prior to and during the Salvadoran civil war are still 
existent today; only today, violence is articulated as a necessary means to achieve publis security 
and peace. The contradiction here is that the state apparatuses used to promote peace, such as the 
police and military, are merely perpetuating the same old systems of domination whereby a 
nation-state claims the right to kill the underserving class through state violence and with 
impunity. My thesis makes an intervention by arguing that the security policies in El Salvador 
are sources of insecurity. As a matter of fact, this introduction to my thesis on state violence 
offers tentative empirical support of the above argument by providing an analysis of the human 
rights violations executed directly by state agents (i.e. law enforcement, army) and facilitated by 
political leaders. In this thesis, I will only focus on a public security policy called the 
extraordinary measures that the leftist FMLN implemented in 2016. Along these lines, I 
conceptualize political violence as the human rights violations and abuse of authority by the 
National Civilian Police and Armed Forces, including extrajudicial killings and forced 
disappearances as well as other forms of physical and psychological abuse such as torture and 
death threats.  
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Table 1: Homicides in El Salvador from 1980-2018 
 
Year Homicides Source 
1980-1992 75,000 United Nations (1992) 
1992-1994 --- Medicina Legal was established in 1999, hence it has no records 
of homicides between years 1992-1993. Source: Ingeniero Juan 
Pablo Velázquez, Colaborador Técnico Departamento de Gestión 
de Información, Medicina Legal. (2018).  
1994-2009 50,000 Mijango (2013) 
2009-2011 12,758 Servicio Social Pasionista (2014) 
2012*-2013 5,093 Servicio Social Pasionista (2014) 
2014-2015 10,568 Servicio Social Pasionista (2017) 
2016 4,881 Procuraduría para la defensa de los Derechos Humanos (2017)  
2017 3,954 FESPAD (2018)  
2018 3,340 Medicina Legal (2018)  
Total 165,594 
*dialogo, “tregua” entre pandillas. In this year, murder rates decreased from 14 homicides daily to 5.5 homicides daily.  
 
 
Positionality: The Personal is Political 
 As a daughter of Salvadoran immigrants, an immigrant from El Salvador, and a 
transnational Salvadoran activist who has built community both in El Salvador and in the United 
States, I recognize the importance of articulating the violence that creates conditions of poverty, 
insecurity, displacement, and psychosocial trauma which are causing real material impacts in the 
lives of many of my family, friends, and the Central American community at large. This thesis is 
an attempt to complicate definitions of peace amidst a postwar period. Many Salvadorans, like 
many of us who are spectators or active agents of political processes, may sometimes adopt 
polarized mentalities and assume that politics are black and white, left and right. Yet, forget that 
we ourselves embody contradictions, and therefore political processes will too. With the end of a 
20-year-long right-wing leadership, 2009 was the year of great promise for el pueblo 
Salvadoreño, the people who so passionately fought for justice, peace, and an end to oligarchic 
ruling. For some, this promise has been fulfilled as the leftist political leadership has made 
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structural advances in the Salvadoran economy and politics. However, for others who are critical 
of the ‘Right-Hand’ of the state (Bourdieu qtd. in Mueller 2016), the 2009 historic election 
marked a year of both promise and contradictions. Returning to the main argument of my thesis, 
this introduction offers tentative empirical support of the above argument by providing an 
analysis of the human rights violations executed directly by the military and police, and 
highlights how such violations have been facilitated by political leaders and legislatures. In this 
thesis, I will only focus on the policies on public security that the leftist FMLN implemented 
since 2009, namely the medidas extraordinarias. Although some may argue that this work is a 
critique of the left, to them I say that as a leftist community and student organizer and at-the-
border sympathizer with the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, this analysis is 
an auto-crítica about the contradictions we, social justice fighters, encounter in our political 
practice.  
To make it clear, I am not dismissing the progress the Salvadoran left has made in ten 
years of political leadership (2009-2019), and I am neither destabilizing the left nor defaming 
political leaders. What I am doing is offering a response to the left’s support for militarization 
and aggressive policing which has led to the violation of human rights, trauma, and suffering 
among poor sectors of society. Perhaps this thesis can serve as a reflective piece to those 
interested in analyzing the cultural and political conditions that led to the rise of the right-wing in 
the 2019 presidential elections. As a matter of fact, in the recent presidential elections held on 
February 3, 2019, after two consecutive executive victories the FMLN only received 14.40% of 
the votes, while the right-wing ARENA party gained 31.72% of the votes, and GANA, the 
emergent right-wing party led by right-wing populist Nayib Bukele4, won the majority of the 
                                                 
4A few facts about Nayib Bukele: Nayib is of Palestenian descent but actively supports the Israeli state. He is the 
owner of Yamaha El Salvador, making him one of the wealthiest men in El Salvador. Bukele rose to the public eye 
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votes with a 53.10%. In this sense, one can argue that the FMLN, who had previously won two 
consecutive presidential elections, is now under pressure to re-examine its governance, including 
its stand on public security. With this thesis, I intend to invite the Salvadoran left to continue to 
do the work of auto-crítica pertaining to their personal positions in matters of public security and 
militarization.    
It is precisely here where my contribution lies: since the 2009 elections, the leftist FMLN 
has given power to the armed forces to secure citizens and combat gang-related crime and 
violence. It is imperative to acknowledge that prior to 2009, the right-wing ARENA5 party had 
implemented Heavy Hand (2003) and Super Heavy Hand (2004) policies that arguably 
manufactured the gang phenomenon through the criminalization of young men, stigmatization of 
poor communities, and mass incarceration. Moreover, in 2008, ARENA signed a decree that 
established the participation of soldiers in matters of civil security (Decree No. 60. Executive 
Branch of the Republic of El Salvador). The signing of this decree showcases that the 
militarization of public security did not start with the Funes’ administration in 2009. However, it 
established the legal and ideological conditions whereby the subsequent government would rely 
                                                 
due to the FMLN’s desire to target the middle class, a sector the party had not succesfully tapped into. Prior to 
running for office, he became mayor of Nuevo Cuscatlan, a middle-class municipal, and gained recognition for the 
installation of street lights. He never considered himself a leftist, and publicly advocates for free markets. Not 
surprisingly, he supports regime change in Venezuela, and he would make El Salvador the 17th country in the world 
to recognize that other guy as President of Venezuela, foolishly placing El Salvador right back into its former place 
as a lackey for the Empire. Nayib has close ties to The OAS and Luis Amalgro, who has actively sought to promote 
the US’s imperial agenda in Latin America, and who is very clearly a CIA agent. Moreover, Nayib was kicked out 
of the FMLN for his repeated attacks on the party, particularly against women, whom he is known to target. He then 
joined GANA, a right-wing party created by former ARENA members in 2010 including some that were accused of 
corruption, and ran as president with this party. His platform was largely based on promoting anti-corruption, while 
never proposing a solution for the age-old contradiction of any and every form of political system. He was accused 
of plagarizing sections of the FMLN’s plan de gobierno. In his plan de gobierno, he proposes building an 
international airport and a train that goes along the coast. He has not mentioned how these projects will be funded, 
but there are only two possibilities: (a) through cutting the FMLN governments’ social programs, which he calls 
“wasteful” or (b) by courting U.S. and European capital. This analysis was produced by Salvadoran activists and 
intellectuals who founded and contribute to the Instagram page @ Salvisbelike_ 
5 Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance).  
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on for projects on civil security. Lastly, in 2015 the right-wing judicial court declared gangs as 
terrorist groups through the passing of the Special Law Against Terrorist Acts. All these right-
wing-sponsored legislatures set the stage for the security policies post-2009 under the lefist 
leadership. Since the Funes’ administration, the FMLN governments (2009-2014 and 2014-2019) 
have increasingly deployed soldiers in joint-task forces with the police to weaken the organizing 
structure of gangs, strengthen security inside of prisons, and reduce gang-related crime and 
violence in the streets. The point I am trying to make is that the militarization of public security 
was not just an effort from the FMLN to achieve peace, and perhaps win electoral votes; rather it 
the militarization of public security under leftist governances must be historically contextualized 
and conceptualized. So why did the FMLN returned to militarized policing when their leadership 
were at some point in history victims of militarized violence? This thesis seeks to provide a 
reflection to this question.  
Moreover, although many Salvadorans would argue that militarized policing is the only 
solution to gang violence, others have outspokenly criticized the subsequent effects caused by 
militarized policing, including the violation of human rights. For this reason, my thesis offers a 
critique to militarized policing and it becomes on itself a denuncia to the abuse of authority, 
institutional impunity, and psychological trauma that are carried out by the Armed Forces and 
the National Civilian Police. Most importantly, the denuncia seeks to hold the United States and 
the Salvadoran nation-state accountable for the lives lost in the so-called ‘guerra contra las 
pandillas’ (war against gangs) whereby countless of civilians are unjustly killed at the hands of 
state agents, namely the national police and armed forces.  
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The Militarization of Public Security: Manufacturing Civilian Insecurity and the 
Militarization Against Collective Action 
So why should you care? Even though the re-militarization of public security has been 
designed to target gang members and weaken the gang structure, the power to abuse and kill that 
has been given to the armed forces and national police can have detrimental effects for 
Salvadoran society as a whole. While joint-task forces have predominantly gone after gangs, 
state agents have also attacked non-gang members, that is, Salvadorans who do not belong to a 
gang. In this sense, state agents have physically and psychologically abused as well as murdered 
gang members (men and women who have been jumped into a gang and are active in their 
‘membership’), those who appear to be members of a gang (including men and women who 
have tattoos, piercings, or live in certain neighborhoods), those who are not in a gang, but whose 
family members and loved ones are active gang members, and anyone who is not a state agent or 
a member of the Salvadoran middle class or elite. In other words, anyone but the elite can be a 
victim of state violence in El Salvador in the context of the extraordinary measures. In short, if 
you are not a member of the middle class or elite, then my thesis concerns you. As an illustration 
of the argument I have forwarded thus far, if you type “soldados El Salvador abuso” on your 
YouTube search, you will come across videos taken by civilians that show soldiers and police 
publicly beat up, harass, and psychologically abuse young men under the presumption that they 
belong to a gang. One common form of such political violence are the verbal abuses directed at 
the women who so often challenge the agents’ authority as they visibly abuse their male 
relatives. In fact, a YouTube video titled “Policia le pegan y disparan a mujer en el salvador esta 
es la realidad del pais ¡¡¡” shows a police officer firing his gun at a woman who was protesting 
the arrest and beating of her loved one.  
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In these conditions, it is no surprise that in the fall of 2017, students from the National 
University of El Salvador protested the militarization of public security. On the day of the rally, 
student carried banners with the words, “Less Soldiers More Education,” “More Arts Less 
Arms,” “I do not want your militarist harassment,” “More Education Less Repression” and “1 
Tank = $5,000,000 = 16,666,67 minimum salaries.” When asked why he was supporting the 
rally, one of the students stressed, “We are not against the security of students, rather we are 
against militarization… Violence and repression [against the youth] are not the solution.” 
Another student expressed, “Us the youth who… are university students when we head back to 
our homes, the police stops us, mistreats us, and sexually harasses women. Believe me, it is not 
safe. Some people say they feel safer, but they must understand that behind the militarization, 
police, and soldiers in the streets, there is much more that can happen, [including] the violation 
of human rights.”6 The students are not mistaken in their analysis. In fact, I have spoken to social 
justice activists about the militarization of public security, and their analysis coincides with that 
of the university students.  
In 2015, during my role as an intern in the Committee in Solidarity for the People of El 
Salvador (CISPES) in Washington, DC, I spoke to a visiting Salvadoran activist about the 
increase of military funding. While my analysis aimed to critique the dehumanization of gang 
members, the activist stressed that her concern with militarization is that now anyone who seems 
to be a threat to the state can be labeled as terrorist, and therefore violence and repression can be 
justified against them. Similarly, in 2018 when I attended a workshop organized by Sister Cities 
in Austin, Texas and facilitated by Salvadoran environmental activists, I expressed my concern 
about the violation of human rights committed by state agents. In response to my comment, the 
                                                 
6 For more, visit: Voces contra la militarización de la capital https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EBrVxg7YK9Q 
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activist said to me that she was surprised to see a military tank in broad daylight in a park in the 
metropolitan area of San Salvador. Consequently, she expressed that in her eyes the purpose of 
the militarization of public security is not just to arrest gang members, but repress collective 
action such as the occupation of parks, streets, and buildings, which are all peaceful actions that 
can now be interpreted as terrorism. So, if you are a social justice warrior, like many of us, then 
this thesis concerns you.  
Thesis Summary by Chapter 
Chapter 1, Public Security Policies Predating Medidas Extraordinarias, outlines the 
policies in which the extraordinary measures were founded. Introduced in 2016, ‘extraordinary 
measures’ are security policies that seek to reduce gang-related crime and violence through the 
training, funding, and deployment of police-military joint-task forces. Particularly, in this chapter 
I problematize the definition of peace, and argue that El Salvador transitioned into a ‘peaceful 
war’ post 1992.  
Chapter 2, An Ordered Disorder: State Violence and Extraordinary Measures, I provide 
a detail description of the extraordinary measures as a security policy, including its relevance in 
public and prison security. Additionally, I narrate the outcomes and human rights abuses 
resulting from this policy. 
In Chapter 3, Made in the USA: Exporting Violence to the Pulgarcito de América, turns 
our attention to the birth of the police and military in El Salvador and the role these (in)security 
institutions have served in the maintenance of a militarized nation-state. Finally, I conclude my 
thesis by presenting an analysis of the social construction of the Salvadoran ‘Other’ in the 
twenty-first century. I end with a remembrance of the ideals and values we ought to strive for as 
the people from a pueblo tan sufrido como lo es El Salvador. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Public Security Policies Predating Medidas Extraordinarias  
____________________________________________________ 
 
Manufacturing Public (In)Security through Mano Dura Policies  
 
It is widely believed that public insecurity in El Salvador can be primarily attributed to 
gang-related violence. Hence, it is imperative to briefly contextualize the birth of gangs in El 
Salvador. In the following segment, I will provide a brief summary of years following the end of 
the civil war to showcase the complex social relations and policies that contributed to the 
creation and growth of gangs as well as gang-related violence.  
By the end of the civil war, an exodus of Salvadorans had emigrated to the United States 
(Abrego 2014). Upon their arrival to Los Angeles, California, Salvadorans experienced ethnic 
discrimination, bullying (Bishop 2016), and police harassment, namely by the Los Angeles 
Police Department. Eventually, a group of young Salvadorans developed a “self-defense” 
mechanism (Mijango 2013) founded on a nationalist Salvadoran identity in the context of the 
Chicano gang culture. Subsequently, these self-defense groups led to the creation of the Mara 
Salvatrucha (MS-13), while others joined the already-established Mexican gang known as Barrio 
18 (18ST). Amidst anti-immigrant sentiments sponsored by the US government, President 
Clinton (1993-2001), supported the implementation of US zero-tolerance anti-gang policies – 
which combined with the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IRAIRA) – resulted in the deportation of thousands of Salvadoran immigrant gang youth 
(Zilberg 2007), including U.S. citizen Salvadorans. The deportation of undocumented and 
documented Salvadorans, some of whom had joined gangs in Los Angeles, “provoked the 
transnationalization of the gang phenomenon” (Mijango 2013). In other words, the United States 
exported gangs to El Salvador through the mass deportation of Salvadoran gang members. By 
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then, the Salvadoran military had successfully infiltrated its agents into the newly formed 
National Civilian Police, ensuring that they continued to operate with impunity.  In this way, 
people were deported to a country dealing with the production of a peaceful war and the re-
structuring of a militaristic state.  
Gang-affiliated deportees were a novelty in El Salvador. Their lifestyles were appealing 
to many youth, especially among those whose parents were assassinated or disappeared in 
previous years during the civil war. In this sense, it has been argued that gangs found in post-war 
El Salvador “an ideal breeding ground in which, until today, continues to encourage the poorest 
young people to join gangs in the face of a lack of opportunities” (Martínez-Fernández 2018). 
Initially, deportee gang members created new social networks for social life was previously 
fragmented by the civil war, so they knitted their own kind of social fabric shaped by their 
experience in Los Angeles. Over time, however, a turf war grew between gangs, namely between 
the MS-13 and Barrio 18. And so, in the face of these turf wars and gang-related crime, the right-
wing ARENA party implemented anti-gang laws to promote public security.  
Right-wing presidencies under Francisco Flores7 (1999-2004) and Antonio Saca (2004-
2009) implemented the Mano Dura (Heavy Handed) and Super Mano Dura (Super Heavy 
Handed) policies in 2003 and 2004, respectively. Essentially, these policies consisted of mass 
incarceration, profiling, and police harassment which led to the arrest and incarceration of at 
least 18,000 young people from resource-poor backgrounds (Rodríguez 2013). Essentially, the 
purpose of these policies was to put an end to street crime and violence. Yet, since their 
implementation violence has rather increased. Miguel Cruz, Salvadoran urban violence 
                                                 
7 During his term, Flores stole $15 million from Taiwan donations for post-earthquake relief. When the news broke 
out, he was put in home arrest, and then was sent to prison. Consequently, Flores’ health deteriorated and is sent 
back to home arrest where he is affected by a stroke which caused ‘irreversible’ damage to his brain. He is taken to 
the Women’s Hospital, and on January 30, 2016, dies at age 56.  
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researcher, maintains that “before the Mano Dura, gangs were responsible more or less seven 
percent of all homicides… After the Mano Dura, gangs were responsible for almost 45 percent of 
homicides in El Salvador” (Miguel Cruz as qtd. in Bishop 2016). That is, the Mano Dura policies 
had the opposite effect they wished to have: gang-related crime and violence increased, 
generating more public insecurity among civilians. According to ARENA politicians, Mano 
Dura policies were needed to respond to increasing rates of gang-related crime and violence.  For 
others, however, Mano Dura policies were strategically implemented for electoral purposes to 
win votes. In other words, public security became a form of punitive populism in El Salvador. 
Some, like myself, would even contest that Mano Dura policies depart from punitive ideologies 
manufactured in the U.S. in the context of racial police profiling and were subsequently exported 
from the United States to El Salvador in the wake of neoliberal growth, including the growth and 
expansion of the prison system also known as the prison-industrial complex (Davis 2003) as well 
as the evolution of privatized protection (Müller 2016) within the Salvadoran context. 
But anti-gang legislations and prisons were not enough to contain street violence. In 
response to the increasing levels of insecurity sponsored by gangs, a clandestine organization 
was formed in the 2000s: the Sombra Negra (Dark Shadow). The dark shadow was and still is a 
clandestine anti-gang extermination group comprised of former and off-duty soldiers and police 
agents. A nascent organization by 1994 (Amnesty International 1996), this group arose in 
response to the repatriation of Salvadoran American gang members (Brigida 2015); since then, 
this group has promoted violent social cleansing practices against gang members and those who 
they presume to belong to a gang. The importance of mentioning the dark shadow is that its roots 
can be traced back to the terror created by state apparatuses such as the police and army during 
the civil war. Although this is not evident in all corpses, one key feature of the black shadow is 
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they tie the thumbs of their victims before murdering them. This practice was a signature of the 
U.S. backed and U.S.-trained death squads during the repression and civil war. It is not a surprise 
that the old structures and agents of violence have found contemporary expressions to continue 
to promote terror among civilians.  
The Militarization of Public Security 
In 2008, the right-wing ARENA8 party signed a decree that established the participation 
of members of the Fuerza Armada de El Salvador (FAES)9 in civil security tasks (Decree No. 60. 
Executive Branch of the Republic of El Salvador). Surprisingly, in 2009, six months after the 
historic victory of the leftist Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), the recently 
elected President Mauricio Funes (2009-2014) signed a decree that established the continuation 
of joint police-military task forces in matters of public security. Around this time, the military 
budget and funding increased in conjunction with more frequent reports of abuse of authority and 
human rights violations by the police and military. The institutional collaboration between the 
FAES and the Policía Nacional Civil (PNC)10 was justified under the understanding that if “the 
resources and efforts of the police institution are insufficient to reduce crime [then] the Armed 
Force will support the national police” (Decree No. 60). Namely, the decree 168 in the 
Salvadoran constitution states, "at the discretion of the President, the Armed Forces could be 
provided exceptionally if the ordinary means for the maintenance of internal peace, tranquility 
and public safety have been exhausted” (Aguilar 2016, emphasis mine). It is under this 
‘loophole’ in the constitution in which the FMLN assigned the army to assist the police in public 
security tasks.  
                                                 
8 Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance).  
9 Armed Forces of El Salvador 
10 National Civilian Police 
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Figure 1: Mauricio Funes, President of El Salvador 2009-2014, FMLN Party 
 
 
 
 
Initially, the Funes’ administration established that the Salvadoran government would 
dispose of the FAES until December 31, 2018 (Decree No. 60. Executive Branch of the Republic 
of El Salvador). Until then, the FAES will support the PNC through (a) prevention of crime, 
deterrence and apprehension of delinquents, (b) provide perimeter security around prisons and 
detention centers for minors, (c) labor custody and security inside prisons, and (d) protecting the 
perimeter of educational centers as well as the national border. For these tasks to be 
implemented, the Salvadoran government created a security plan in collaboration with the 
General Command of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the 
Ministry of National Defense, and the National Civilian Police. While the soldiers in the joint-
task forces would be under the supervision of the PNC, the leadership of the Armed Forces 
would help develop the policing strategy under the leadership of the president. In addition to the 
significant increase in military presence in civil security, the Ley de Proscripción de Maras y 
Pandillas11 was passed during the Funes administration.  
 
 
                                                 
11 Law of Proscription of Gangs 
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Figure 2: Salvador Sánchez-Cerén, President of El Salvador 2014-2019, FMLN Party 
 
 
 
 
Following the second consecutive electoral victory of the FMLN in 2014, this time by 
former guerrilla commander Salvador Sánchez-Cerén (2014-2019), efforts to promote peace and 
public security were tainted by a legacy of violence, militarization, and punitive populism. In 
fact, the state’s fight against gangs are a continuum of the type of “punitive populism”12 that was 
previously used by the right-wing party. In response to high rates of violence and homicides, the 
Sánchez-Cerén administration created a five-year plan that focused on three important 
interventions with the purpose of building a better El Salvador. At the center of these projects 
was public security. The documents consisted of three main projects: El Plan Quinquenal de 
Desarrollo 2014-201913, the Plan El Salvador Seguro14, and la Política Nacional de Justicia, 
Seguridad Pública, y Convivencia15. 
                                                 
12 In a context of coffee exploitation, the National Guard (a paramilitary group founded in 1912) was created to 
appease discontent in coffee fields. It was clear that the creation of these groups was linked to the protection of the 
economic interests of the Salvadoran oligarchy, the so-called “14 Families” - whom by the 1970s own the wealth of 
the entire country. Then, in 1992, then-President Alfredo Cristiani from the ARENA party deployed the FAES in 
coffee growing areas, a practice that was inherited by years of militarization and popular repression, only now it was 
done in a context of “post” civil war. However, it was until the years 2003 and 2004 when the FAES was re-
introduced to public security matters in the combat against gang members. The fight against gangs was integrated 
into electoral campaigns, resulting in the re-direction of people’s attention to gangs as the main problem of society. 
Therefore, the use of the FAES in public security became a form of punitive populism which followed a type of cop-
for-a-vote mentality whereby heavy policing promised to bring peace. For more, read FESPAD 2017.  
13 The Five-Year Plan 
14 Plan for Safe El Salvador 
15 The National Policy of Justice, Public Safety, and Coexistence 
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First, the Plan Quinquenal de Desarrollo had three major purposes: to create jobs, 
promote education and establish public security. These goals were formulated around the 
concept of citizen security16.  Then, the government created five strategies to achieve the goals of 
this plan. The most important components were to: (a) prevent violence, (b) strengthen the 
criminal investigation system to reduce the capacity of expansion and execution of criminal 
structures, (c) provide attention to victims of violence, (d) tighten prison control with a 
‘restorative justice’ component, and (e) strengthen institutions. The latter primarily aimed to 
combat criminal structures, have a better control of weapons and ammunition, and strengthen an 
anti-crime coordinating mechanism in the Central American region.  
Second, the Plan El Salvador Seguro supported the security strategies of la Política 
Nacional de Justicia, Seguridad Pública, y Convivencia. Specifically, the former was executed 
under the notion that, “the State is the first and great responsible for guaranteeing and protecting 
the life, integrity and patrimony of all citizens.”17 And lastly, the Política Nacional de Justicia, 
Seguridad Pública, y Convivencia promoted five goals: to (a) prevent crime and violence, (b) 
control and repress crime and violence, (c) promote rehabilitation and social reinsertion, (d) 
provide attention to victims of violence, and (e) strengthen institutions to ensure security and 
justice. Uniquely, the Sánchez-Cerén government proposed the use of technologies for 
“situational prevention in public spaces” as well as the improvement of technology and 
equipment for the PNC.  
                                                 
16 The Salvadoran government defines Citizen Security as, “the protection of all people, life, integrity and their 
assets against predatory crime, through the organization of multiple social actors focused on work prevention of 
violence and crime with participation of citizens.”  
17 Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Ciudadana y Convivencia (El Salvador). (2015). Plan El Salvador Seguro. 
Gobierno de El Salvador. p.19. 
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While the Salvadoran government has strengthened the police through funding and 
training, the Salvadoran army has also received such support. Needleless to say, it is not a 
surprise that the United States has been a leading force in the funding and training of Salvadoran 
soldiers and law enforcement as you will read in Chapter 3. Despite the role the Salvadoran elite 
and the United States have had in the manufacturing of violence in El Salvador, most 
Salvadorans would probably agree that the main source of crime, violence, and insecurity is 
caused by gangs. Perhaps not. Others may argue that gangs are not the source, but rather a 
symptom of structural violence, thus emphasizing responsibility on the highly articulated 
capitalist system of oppression whereby gender and race domination come to play a role in the 
manufacturing of gangs (i.e. toxic masculinities, racial segregation). But again, most people 
would insist that gangs are responsible for violence and insecurity in El Salvador, and they are 
not wrong. Gangs do commit acts of violence and crime such as killings, economic extortion, 
and threats, but the point I am trying to emphasize here is that there are larger, more 
sophisticated and organized systems of oppression that one must critique and continue to 
highlight in matters of civil (in)security. Moreover, some may argue that to reduce crime and 
violence one must eradicate gangs at all costs, and in fact some Salvadorans have placed trust in 
the militarization of public security to reduce violence generated by gangs. However, I must 
remind readers that the deployment of soldiers in civil security violate agreements that were 
established in the 1992 Peace Accords. Hence, the militarization of public security is not only a 
fundamental violation of peace, but a strategy to forward conditions of a peaceful war.  
According to the Peace Accords, the demilitarization of internal security was a necessary 
step toward the construction of peace and democracy in El Salvador. Aguilar herself writes that 
in the Peace Accords it was agreed the Salvadoran military would become “an obedient, 
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professional and not deliberative institution… not decisive in the political field (ONU, 1993). It 
was established that its mission was the defense of the state’s sovereignty and territorial integrity 
(Art. 212, Constitution)” (Aguilar 2016). As established by the Peace Accords, the newly formed 
National Civilian Police was assigned as gatekeepers of public security. In fact, the national 
police was “conceived as an independent entity from the armed forces (ONU, 1993)... It was 
established that public security would be the competence of civil institutions and not of the 
military” (Aguilar 2016). In other words, while the Peace Accords clearly outlined the roles the 
army and police should play in postwar El Salvador– one will be in charge of national security 
and the other of public security, respectively – the decree implemented in 2008 by ARENA and 
the subsequent security policies forwarded by the FMLN contradict the Peace Accords. That is, 
demilitarization is an important component for the promotion of peace and democracy, yet both 
parties have decided to re-militarize public security in El Salvador, thus generating the 
conditions for weak democracies and blurred conceptions of peace.  
Thus, I highlight that the lack of transparency in matters of national and civil security as 
per agreed to during the Peace Accords served to institutionalize violence, thus guising it under 
the name of peace. In this way, a peaceful war follows a logic of warfare which is used to justify 
violent means to achieve peace in ‘postwar’ times. One would think that a postwar country in a 
transition to peace becomes peaceful. However, “the very notion of a postwar era can have the 
effects of deflecting attention from the existence of subtler forms of violence” (Benson et al. 
2008 as qutd in Menjívar 2011), including institutionalized “chronic violence” (Pearce 2007) that 
the state does not articulate as war, such as police violence. Additionally, “the apparent calm or 
normality that can be seen in [El Salvador]” according to Martín-Baró (2000), “is part of this 
state of war, which requires a refusal before the collective conscience in order to continue to act 
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without political [or] ethical questioning” (240). In other words, the social normality experienced 
in the context of violence is part of ‘this state of war’ in which the state refuses to articulate 
violent social dynamics as war-like. The problem with the use of violence in a ‘postwar’ era is 
that it reaps what it seeks to end: violence at the expense of peace. In the end, one cannot fight 
violence with violent means. Otherwise, this violence would become a war in times of peace––
hence, a peaceful war.  
How did the FMLN implement security policies that contradict the agreements stated in 
the Peace Accords? The re-militarization of public security was made possible by a loophole in 
the Constitution. In fact, the Salvadoran constitution, which was re-written in 1992 as part of the 
Peace Accords, established that "at the discretion of the president, the Armed Forces could be 
disposed of exceptionally if the ordinary means for the maintenance of internal peace, tranquility 
and public insecurity have been exhausted (Art. 168, section 12, Constitution)" (Aguilar 2016, 
emphasis mine). At first glance, Salvadorans may believe the re-militarization of public security 
can promote civil security and peace. But on the closer inspection, one must keep in mind the 
role the military has had in the history of El Salvador. That is, the military has been used as a 
state apparatus to repress popular uprising and promote fear and insecurity, particularly for 
economic and political purposes. What I am trying to argue is that today the terrorists can be 
those who belong to gangs, but tomorrow the terrorists can become anyone who dares to 
question and resist the status quo, meaning anyone who does not necessarily belong to a gang. 
Hence, the militarization of public security is a matter that should concern us all in El Salvador 
as well as the Salvadoran diaspora.  
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Tracing the Militarization of Public Security Post 1992 
Under the right-wing presidency of Alfredo Cristiani18 (1989-1994), the FAES made 
multiple successful attempts to remain a hegemonic institution post-civil war. Particularly, the 
FAES prevented its structure from disarticulating. To be successful at it, they did not collaborate 
in the process to form the National Civilian Police, and instead infiltrated the National Civilian 
Police by assigning human rights violators in ranking positions in the newly-formed police 
(Costa 1999). Additionally, the FAES did not decrease their military personnel by 50 percent as 
it was agreed to in the Peace Accords, nor did the government reduce the military spending. 
Since then, the military repeatedly attempted to regain control of public security under the 
presumption that there were new threats.  
Two decades later, during the Funes government (2009-2014) and under the supervision 
of the Minister of Justice and Security, General David Munguía Payes, the FMLN gave the 
FAES the green light to re-gain control of civil security. To take a case in point, the first increase 
in the army’s annual budget occurred in 2001 under the right-wing AREA governance. While in 
1998 the budget consisted of $79 million, by 2001 it had significantly increased to $109 million. 
The second increase occurred between 2002 and 2008, a period ruled by the ARENA party. In 
this period, the annual budget designated to national defense went from $106 million to $125 
million (Aguilar 2016). The third significant increase in military budget occurred in 2010 during 
the leftist FMLN administration. While in 2008 the military budget consisted of $125 million, by 
                                                 
18 By 1989, a group of businessmen owed 705 million US dollars (then 3 thousand 525 million colones) to banks 
owned by the State, which was equivalent to 70 percent of everything the banks had lent. During Cristiani’s 
presidency, these businessmen were pardoned, the banks were privatized, and some were bought by the same 
businessmen who had broken them. In 2005-2008 (during the right-wing Antonio Saca presidency) banks were sold 
to foreign companies. In sum, during Cristiani’s presidential term, $1,490.1 million dollars were lost to state fraud 
($9 million), burial of medicines ($17.1 million), sale of electricity to U.S. company ($759 million), and the 
sanitation and privatization of banks ($705 million). For more, read “Álbum: Corrupción de ARENA” by Equipo 
Maíz (2014). 
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2010 the budget increased to $147 million. In the consecutive years, 2012 and 2014, the budget 
increased to $150 million and remained constant with $149 million (Aguilar 2016). In sum, the 
military budget has been progressively increasing since the years under a right-wing 
administration, but the highest budget peaked during the FMLN ruling under former president 
Funes.  
Moreover, under the Funes administration, I stress that the FAES was deployed for 
internal security matters. That is, to protect Salvadorans from the threat of gangs and promote 
security. In fact, the deployment of the FAES in public security required a military spending 
greater than its budget. Specifically, the military spending consisted of $228 million in 2009, but 
peaked in 2013 with $269 million. By 2013, the military spending was $257 million, despite a 
deficit in the state’s finances. Not surprisingly, the reports of human rights abuses committed by 
the armed forces increased by 537% between 2009 and 2011 (Aguilar 2016).  
 
Table 2: US-funded military budget to the Armed Forces of El Salvador, 1992-2014 (in millions  
   of US$) 
 
 
Source: Córdoba for years 1992-1998, and Ministry of Finance for years 2001-2014, as cited in Aguilar (2016) 
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Importing Technologies of Terror  
 
“Todos aquellos miembros de la policía que por motivos de su trabajo  
tengan que emplear armas de fuego contra un delincuente, que lo hagan  
con toda la confianza. Hay una institución que los respalda. Hay un  
gobierno que nos apoya.”         
-Mauricio Ramírez Landaverde19  
 
Historically, El Salvador’s strategies on civilian security have been coordinated alongside 
the United States. The organization and implementation of security policies in El Salvador are a 
transnational effort whereby the United States has had a strong influence in El Salvador’s anti-
gang legislatures. In an attempt to learn more about the militarization and repressive policing in 
El Salvador, I interviewed Laura Embree-Lowry, former Program Director for the Committee in 
Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES).20 Laura asserted that public security in El 
Salvador is transnationally collaborated between these two countries: 
 
When the Obama administration first took office, one of the policy pieces they put 
out towards El Salvador was the creation of this Partnership for Growth. It did not 
involve any funding assistance. Solely, it was a partnership by which the U.S. was 
going to help El Salvador approve policies that would allow its economy to grow. 
So, it didn’t really have a security component to its mission. But when the first 
reports came out from the task force that was created, which included economic 
experts and government officials from the United States as well as from El 
Salvador, their first reports were almost entirely about security. Basically, they 
determined that security was one of the biggest challenges for economic growth in 
El Salvador and used that to say, “therefore these new security measures need to be 
taken and we need all this increase cooperation between the U.S. and Salvadoran 
police. 
 
 In this excerpt, Laura has mentioned two important factors that must not be ignored when 
discussing public security policies in El Salvador. First, she sheds light to the role that the 
Partnership for Growth has had in El Salvador. While the Partnership for Growth seeks to help 
                                                 
19 Former Director of PNC and Minister of Justice and Security 
20 CISPES is a transnational solidarity organization founded in the 1980s by Salvadoran refugees and North 
American activists. 
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improve the economy of El Salvador, the initial report suggested that violence was a major 
challenge for economic growth in El Salvador. Thus, the report became a document on civil 
security, and not on the Salvadoran economy per se. Secondly, the US government suggested 
that a certain type of new security measures need to be taken and we need all this increase 
cooperation between the U.S. and Salvadoran police. In other words, the report for the 
Partnership for Growth established the ground rules El Salvador must follow to receive 
economic aid from the United States: to implement US-sponsored security policies, including the 
collateral collaboration between the US’s and El Salvador’s police. By providing this example, I 
insist that the report from the Partnership for Growth was a way to influence El Salvador’s 
legislature on civil security. Laura also highlighted how U.S.-sponsored, zero-tolerance and anti-
gang models become transnationalized through US partnerships with El Salvador, 
 
And they [US and Salvadoran officials] talked about the need to ‘improve their 
technical investigator capacity by using more modern techniques for investigation.’ 
You also see a lot of collaboration and sharing of strategies between the US and 
Salvadoran police forces. One of the main elements for the Partnership for Growth 
was moving toward a computerized system to monitor crime in El Salvador. And it 
was a system that is in place in the Chicago Police Department…. It goes into the 
‘broken window’ theory of policing where what they are doing is they are cracking 
down on extremely minor crimes and they are increasing the criminalization of 
communities rather than actually showing results that it prevents bigger crimes.  
 
The Chicago’s computerized system of violence prevention is not the only policing 
model that has been imported into El Salvador. As previously demonstrated, in 2003 and 2004 
the Plan Mano Dura and Super Mano Dura policies were passed as a model for public security. 
With the passing of these policies, the Salvadoran army directly participated in anti-gang civil 
security operations for the first time post-peace accords. These repressive zero-tolerance and 
anti-gang operations were inspired by Mayor of New York, Rudi Giuliani (1994-2001). Not 
surprisingly, these policies suggested that minors who commit crimes should be treated like 
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adults. As an illustration, John Huvane, then-president of Giuliani Security and Safety and 
former NYC police officer said, “if a child of 14 commits a crime, they should be treated as an 
assassin” (Grandin 2015). Giuliani’s criminalization and dehumanization toward young men and 
boys not only influenced public security policies domestically, but set the tone for repressive 
policing and militarization in El Salvador in the years to come. 
The Violent Paradox of the Politics of Peace  
According to the United Nations’ (1993) El Salvador Truth Commission, there were 
22,000 reports of human rights abuses committed during the Salvadoran civil war of which 
around 85 percent were attributed to victims of state agents, namely military, paramilitary 
groups, and the US-funded death squads21. Human rights abuses have often been accompanied 
by institutional impunity that favors state agents and state violence. According to Jeannette 
Aguilar, Director of the University Public Opinion Institute (IUDOP), “five days after the 
publication of the [UN’s] Truth Commission report... the [Salvadoran] assembly approved the 
Amnesty Law to guarantee the impunity of all those involved in serious cases of human rights 
violations committed before January 1, 1992” (Aguilar 2016). Even though the majority of the 
human rights abuses attributed the violence to the state agents, the police and army were not held 
accountable and instead were given a green light to continue to use violence as tactic for social 
order. In addition to institutional impunity, the Salvadoran government has refused to release the 
names of state agents who were trained in the US and who were accused of human rights 
violations. Despite the efforts to de-militarize El Salvador and seek justice from impunity, we 
                                                 
21 Roberto D'Aubuisson, School of the Americas (SOA) graduate, co-founded the dead squads, and responsible for 
the 1980 execution of Monsignor Oscar Romero. In 1981, he founded the right-wing ARENA party and became its 
first leader. After transnational activist and political mobilization, the SOA changed its name to the Western 
Hemisphere Institute for Security Operation (WHINSEC). WHINSEC continues to train soldiers worldwide in 
counterinsurgency tactics which include torture, disappearances, and assassinations.  
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only know the names of a few SOA graduates responsible for the massacres committed against 
working-class Salvadorans. In this way, distinguished organizations such as the School of the 
Americas Watch (SOAW) and the Mauricio Aquino Foundation are still fighting for justice.  
Despite this haunting legacy of a repressive Salvadoran military and the antagonistic 
history between the military and revolutionary leftist groups, the FMLN government has relied 
on joint police-military task forces to ensure public security, and paradoxically, promote the 
peace us Salvadorans have been yearning for. That the FMLN has the FAES in public security is 
a contradiction. It is precisely this paradox that speaks to the larger capitalistic and imperialist 
policies the United States has exerted over El Salvador; and it is precisely here where lies a point 
of departure to do the work of auto-crítica among the Salvadoran left.  
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CHAPTER 2 
An Ordered Disorder: State Violence, Extraordinary 
Measures and the Politics of ‘Social Cleansing’  
______________________________________________________________________________  
 
Extraordinary Measures  
 
In 2016, the Sánchez-Cerén government implemented the controversial Extraordinary 
Measures in three areas: public security, prisons, and legislation. The main goal of these 
measures was to secure prisons, protecting citizens from the violence and crime that is being 
orchestrated from inside prisons. A secondary priority was to promote civilian security via the 
deployment of state agents and tanks equipped with large caliber weapons (FESPAD 2017). In 
fact, “the use of the army in public security matters is not new in El Salvador, since it has been 
taking place since the establishment of Joint Task Groups in the early 1990s” (FESPAD 2017). 
While the FMLN has re-militarized the streets of El Salvador, it is important to note that this is 
not the first time joint task groups are deployed in the name of public security. Unfortunately, the 
medidas extraordinarias, according to FESPAD22, present “a serious step backwards to the 
fulfillment of the Peace Accords.” To reiterate, the peace accords established that only the 
national civilian police will be the designated entity in charge of promoting public security, not 
the army. Yet, this enigma and surprise of the militarization of social life in times of ‘peace’ was 
validated by a Salvadoran environmental activist who expressed to me, “we were surprised to see 
military tanks in 2016-2017 around plazas” (Mirna 2018, personal communication). 
Furthermore, the main goal of these measures is to make prison management more 
efficient, and thus protect citizens from the violence and crime that is orchestrated from inside 
prisons. Particularly, it is believed that incarcerated gang members ‘call the shots’ from inside 
                                                 
22Fundación de Estudios para la Aplicación del Derecho 
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prisons, therefore tighter prison management and security was thought to bring a reduction of 
crime and violence outside prisons. While some have supported the medidas extraordinarias, 
others have argued that the means to achieve public security violate the human rights of 
prisoners and citizens (SPASS 2016, FESPAD 2018).  
In prisons, these measures mainly consisted of isolating incarcerated persons through the 
transferring of inmates between prisons, suspending transfers of inmates, restricting family visits, 
isolating inmates through confinement or by placing them in “special cells.” Additionally, soon 
after the measures were implemented, court dates were suspended for a month and the 
telecommunication traffic around the perimeter of prisons was cut. Beside tighter prison security, 
the extraordinary measures included the deployment of joint military-police task forces on the 
streets. The main goal of these joint-task forces was to locate, arrest, and incarcerate gang 
members. Hence, in addition to the police agents who were already responsible for overseeing 
the streets of El Salvador (Escalante Saracais 2016), 1,600 soldiers from the Armed Forces and 
1,000 National Police officers were deployed nationwide. Initially, three joint police-military 
groups were formed to promote civil security, but over time the government created various task 
forces, including the Fuerzas Especializadas de Reacción23 (FES)24, Fuerzas de Intervención y 
Recuperación de Territorios25 (FIRT)26, Fuerzas de Tarea “Centro Histórico”27 (Escalante 
                                                 
23 The FES gave birth to an extermination group. For more read, “La policía maquilla sus unidades élite 
involucradas en delitos” by Bryan Avelar (2018); “En la intimidad del escuadrón de la muerte de la policía” by 
Bryan Avelar and Juan Martínez d’Aubuisson; “Policía detiene a los agentes del grupo de exterminio revelado por 
Factum” by Fernando Romero (2017). 
24 Special Reaction Forces 
25 The FIRT is particularly prone to committing extrajudicial executions. For more see, “Official Data Suggests El 
Salvador Police Kill With Impunity” by Roberto Valencia (2015).  
26 Intervention and Territorial Recovery Forces 
27 Task Forces “Centro Histórico”  
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Saracais 2016), as well as the Grupos Conjuntos de Apoyo a la Comunidad28 which were all 
comprised of the PNC and FAES (SPASS 2017).  
While the Sánchez-Cerén government implemented the extraordinary measures, it is 
important to highlight that these measures were a collective effort between the left- and right-
wing groups. Particularly, the actors behind these new security legislations and legislative 
reforms included the right-wing ARENA party as well as centrist-right parties like the Great 
Alliance for National Unity (GANA) and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Additionally, 
the Salvadoran Government (GOES), Legislative Assembly, General Prosecutor of the Republic 
(FGR), and the Ministry of Justice and Public Security (MJSP). Ultimately, the purpose of these 
security measures was to facilitate prison sentence and better control inside prisons. However, 
the legislature included public security as part of these security measures, which was precisely 
how the joint task forces were formed. Lastly, it is of great importance to state that out of three 
security laws that were reformed by politicians, only one law addressed police conduct29. The 
fact that there was a greater emphasis on securitizing the streets of El Salvador over police 
conduct set the stage for the human right violations against civilians that I will present next.   
Outcomes and Human Rights Abuses by the FAES and PNC: A Look Inside Prisons  
Incarcerated inmates were negatively impacted by these policies. Historically, inmates in 
Salvadoran prisons have been denied of health, security, a fair trial, and programs of re-
adaptation; but these conditions of precariousness worsened with the implementation of the 
extraordinary measures. As an illustration, in 2016 there were 2,039 reports of human rights 
violations inside prisons, including the lack of medical and mental assistance. According to the 
then-General Director of Penal Centers, Rodil Fernando Hernández Somoza, inmates were given 
                                                 
28 Joint Community Support Groups 
29 Police Disciplinary Law 
  32 
medical and psychiatric attention during the implementation of the extraordinary measures. 
However, the on-site observations conducted by the PDDH contrast his statements. In fact, some 
incarcerated individuals who suffer from medical and psychological irregularities (i.e. 
“pulmonary tuberculosis,” “nervous colitis,” “anxiety,” “aggressiveness,” “neurotic symptoms,” 
“psychosomatic diseases”) were not given any medical attention due to shortage in medical and 
psychological personnel. Similarly, when inmates or children of inmates––as in the case inside 
women’s prisons––were given gynecological or pediatric assistance, inmates reported poor 
quality of health care as well as a shortage of medicine.  
Additionally, in the same year relatives of inmates submitted 675 reports regarding the 
lack of medical and psychological assistance inside prisons. These reports coincided with an 
investigation conducted by the PDDH. According Hernández Somoza, in 2016 there were 518 
reported cases of tuberculosis in prisons where extraordinary measures were implemented, 
corresponding to a rise of 400% of reported cases of tuberculosis (PDDH 2017). Comparatively, 
there were only 328 reported cases of tuberculosis in prisons where extraordinary measures were 
not implemented. In other words, the prison conditions where the extraordinary measures were 
implemented were worsened so much so that the prison population suffered a rise in 400% of 
tuberculosis cases. The PDDH considers the rise of tuberculosis in these prisons as a “serious 
health crisis” given the conditions of vulnerability that inmates live in. They added, “it is perhaps 
the most serious consequence that extraordinary measures leave inside prisons, and that urgent 
attention is needed to avoid further damage to the health of the prison population and of the 
Salvadoran population in general if it is not treated beforehand to avoid epidemics." That is, the 
extraordinary measures made the health conditions more precarious inside prisons, which can 
have a spill-over effect over the general Salvadoran society.  
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Moreover, relatives of inmates reported inhabitable prison conditions (No. of reports: 
458), transfer of inmates to other prisons (No. of reports: 297), personal care kits that were 
dropped off by them and were never given to inmates (No. of reports: 97), lack of explanation 
for solitary confinement (No. of reports: 21), malnourishment (No. of reports: 20), among others. 
The PDDH’s reports on the extraordinary measures were corroborated in an interview I had with 
Verónica Reyna, staff at a human rights organization called the Passionist Social Service. She 
expressed:  
For us, the measures in penal centers is an effort on the part of the government 
against gang leaders where they are tortured without touching: 'I'm not going to hit 
you, I'm not going to kill you directly; I'm going to isolate you, and I'm going to let 
you die because I'm not going to give you medical attention by keeping conditions 
of contagion... And since nobody watches over me, it does not matter.' No one has 
the capacity to enter prisons. For me it is like a punishment strategy. And it is a 
demonstration of (the state’s) strength against the gangs. 
 
According to Verónica Reyna, unhealthy and contagious prison conditions become an 
additional punishment against the incarcerated. That is, keeping prisons in unlivable conditions 
(by prison standards) becomes the state’s punishment and solution to violence whereby 
conditions of maiming, debility, and wounding are utilized as security strategies. Consequently, 
the state’s neglect toward the incarcerated dehumanize gangs with the hope that it will 
(somehow) debilitate them enough to the point of incapacitation or death, hence reducing their 
potential to perpetuate violence ever again. Under this logic, the reduction of violence is 
attributed to the crippling or death of gang members. To understand how the practice of debility 
functions as the state’s apparatus of violence, it is useful to engage with the concept of maiming. 
Jasbir Puar (2017) forwards that maiming “functions not as an incomplete death or an accidental 
assault on life, but as the end goal [is] the dual production of permanent disability… and the 
attrition of the life support systems that might allow populations to heal from this harm” (143). 
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By drawing on the Israeli settler colonial invasion in Palestine, Puar uses maiming as a 
biopolitical practice to complicate the distinctions between living and dying. As an illustration, 
the author argues that Israeli soldiers employ a maiming technology in which they wound 
Palestinians to neither completely kill them, nor completely keep them alive. This practice is 
known as the ‘shoot-to-cripple’ protocol. In the context of Salvadoran prisons where 
extraordinary measures were implemented, the physiological and psychological debilitation of 
incarcerated gang members is both a punishment and a crippling strategy. Unfortunately, the 
practice of maiming inside prisons impacts incarcerated gang members as well as inmates who 
have yet to be given a prison sentence which means that they are innocent under the 
Constitution. In other words, even people who do not commit crimes but who are wrongfully 
accused and incarcerated become victims of the state’s neglect in the prison system. 
Another problem with the extraordinary measures is that it has failed to fulfill its purpose. 
While the purpose of these measures was to ensure security inside prisons, a report by the PDDH 
proves otherwise. According to the PDDH (2017), prison staff has been unable to provide proper 
protection for “at-risk inmates.” To elaborate, there were 47 inmates who died in 2016. Out of 
these, 24 were waiting for a court sentence which under the Salvadoran penal code it means that 
they were innocent at the time of their death. Moreover, out of these 47 deaths, 19 died out of 
natural cause/sickness which means that their deaths were preventable. Additionally, 16 of the 47 
were murdered, and 12 were not given a cause of death (PDDH 2017). Since these deaths 
happened during the guardianship of the state, the PDDH places accountability for their deaths 
on the General Directorate of Penal Centers as well as the penitentiary and criminal justice 
systems. As a matter of fact, the PDDH report states, “it should be taken into account that one of 
the objectives of the implementation of the extraordinary measures in the prisons was precisely 
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that the administration recovered or took control of the interior of the prisons. In this sense, the 
[fact that the] number of deaths that occurred in prisons [has] not decreased is unacceptable.” To 
this day, the Salvadoran state has yet to accept that its approach to keeping inmates in unlivable 
conditions is both a punishment and an expression of violence.  
Outcomes and Human Rights Abuses by the FAES and the PNC: A Look Inside Bartolinas 
Since the implementation of the Mano Dura and Super Mano Dura, bartolinas (detention 
centers at police stations) have been turned into extensions of prisons. It is estimated that over 
5,000 people are incarcerated in bartolinas, surpassing a 300 percent capacity (Avelar 2017). 
Each cell inside bartolinas is four meters long and four meters wide. However, cells are 
overcrowded with 60 people, as opposed to its capacity of 10. While the maximum time 
someone can be detained in the bartolinas is three days, detainees spend months and even years 
in these police detention stations (Avelar 2017). Since bartolinas are an extension of prisons, it is 
predictable that the same logic of extreme punishment and maiming apply to these detention 
centers. In a bartolina located in the city of Zacamil, the PNC does not have the resources to feed 
the 207 men and 32 women who have been deprived of their liberty. Every day for three times a 
day a line is formed outside its gate. Daily, female relatives come here to drop off food for the 
inmates, while others who cannot commit to this daily hassle choose to purchase meals and 
personal kits in advance. Cocar López, an informal businessman, oversees this business. 
Particularly, he is in charge of selling and delivering the food and kits to the inmates. Every 
month, Cocar makes $4,908 just from selling the kits. His monthly earnings from selling the food 
was not disclosed in the report, but one can assume that an additional couple thousand dollars are 
added to his wallet from selling food. The problem is that relatives claim that the food and kits 
are not always delivered to the detainees. Another problem is that the police confiscate 
  36 
everything the detainees have shortly after the kits have been delivered, leaving detainees with 
nothing. The confiscation of food and personal kits are harmful to the men and women who are 
already restricted access from food and personal hygiene inside these bartolinas, which is how 
malnutrition and illnesses become a part of the bartolina experience. To return to the previous 
argument on maiming, the restricted access to food, potable water, personal kits and health care 
inside these bartolinas are an additional punishment to detainees which can cause physical and 
psychological debilitation among detainees. Resulting from these conditions of precarity, 
detainees in the Zacamil and Cuscatancingo bartolinas were reported to have been infected with 
Sarna––a highly contagious sickness that causes itching, rashes and blisters and appear between 
finger, genitals, and other parts of the body. As a matter of fact, according to a chief of police 
some detainees in these bartolinas “cannot even sit due to the fungus they have in the anus” 
(Avelar 2017).  
Outcomes and Human Rights Abuses by the FAES and the PNC: State Agents Target 
Civilians 
The government created various U.S.-funded and U.S.-trained joint police-military task 
forces, one of which was named Fuerzas Especializadas de Reacción30. Shortly after, the FES 
gained notoriety for becoming an anti-gang extermination group.31 As a matter of fact, these joint 
police-military task forces - including the FES, the GRP and the Armed Forces - have been 
accused of committing forced disappearances32, extrajudicial killings33, massacres and 
psychological terror in times of ‘peace.’34 In this way, the militarization of public security has 
                                                 
30 Special Reaction Forces 
31 For more read, “La Policía maquilla sus unidades élite involucradas en delitos” by Bryan Avelar.  
32 “La Fuerza Armada desaparició a tres jóvenes en tiempos de paz” by María Cidón Kiernan  
33 “En la intimidad del escuadron de la muerte de la policía” by Bryan Avelar & Martínez d’Aubuisson 
34 “La Policía masacró en la finca San Blas” by Roberto Valencia, Oscar Martínez, and Daniel Caravantes  
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violated the human rights of citizens. Such a violence in times of peace is predominantly directed 
from men to men. For example, the Salvadoran police has had a ratio of one (male) officer killed 
for every 53 (male) gang members slain (Valencia 2016). This is to say that most victims at the 
hands of state agents and teenage boys and men.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2014 
 
In 2014, two years before the medidas extraordinarias were implemented, the Fiscalía 
General de la República (FGR)35 and Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos 
(PDDH)36 received a report of three forced disappearances. Although these disappearances did 
not occur as a consequence of the extraordinary measures, they did occur a couple of years after 
the military was re-assigned in the task of civil security. Hence, what I am trying to emphasize in 
the following sections is that the militarization of public security generates insecurity, 
uncertainty, and is dangerous for the collective wellbeing of Salvadoran society.  
On February 18 around 8:45 a.m., six agents of the FAES frisked six young men who 
were hanging out by the steps of a house. When the agents frisked the young men, one said he 
lived in the house right across where the frisk was taking place, so he was told to go away. The 
other five were arrested and instructed to walk along the train rail. As these young men walked 
                                                 
35 General Prosecutor of the Republic 
36 Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights 
Óscar Oswaldo Leiva Mejía, Francisco Javier Hernández Gómez 
y José Fernando Choto Choto. 
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along the trail, the agents beat and verbally abused them. At some point, the agents stop and let 
two of them go. These two young men did not walk far, and later returned to where they had 
been let go which was the place where they last saw their friends. However, by the time they 
returned, there were no traces of Francisco, Óscar or José, their friends who were last seen in the 
hands of agents of the armed forces. On the same day, Francisco’s mother went to the police 
station to inquire about his son. She spoke to Sergeant Coreto who oversaw the frisk. Sergeant 
Coreto responded to the mother that “They will come back,” and instead of worrying about his 
son’s whereabouts that she should go back to her house to “do the house chores.” To this day, 
these three young men have yet to be found.  
This incident raises questions about potential clandestine graves as well as human and 
organ trafficking present in the Central American region, but this is out of the scope of my thesis. 
But the point I am trying to make with the previous illustration is that forced disappearances are 
a strategy of state violence. In this way, the forced disappearance of these young men (men who 
could have been my relatives or friends) complicate our understanding of peace, and support my 
argument that state violence is an expression of a peaceful war. One clear example is the 
disproportionate killing of gang members with the use of weapons. In 2014, the PNC reported 
256 “confrontations” with presumed gang members. These armed confrontations resulted in 83 
deaths of men who were presumed to be in a gang (Silva Ávalos 2017) while there was not a 
single fallen officer. These statistics show that gang members are being disproportionately 
targeted and killed during confrontations with the police and military. Another important point to 
highlight from this example is that what the police report as ‘confrontations’ are often used as an 
excuse to fire at unarmed gang members, as you will read in the following sections. Often, the 
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police place guns near the assassinated bodies of their victims to make it seem as if gangs started 
the confrontation, thus justifying their assassinations in the eyes of the public.  
 
2015-2016 
In 2015, seven cases of torture were reported to the Servicio Social Pasionista (SPASS)37. 
According to Verónica Reyna, Subdirector for the Human Rights Observatory by SPASS, these 
tortures consisted of beatings and had characteristics “similar to those that occurred in the 80s 
during the armed conflict: electric shocks, immersion of the head in water, play with the trigger 
of the gun pointing at the head... tying people by their feet inside bartolinas [police detention 
centers], electric shocks... in genitals” (Kiernan 2017). According to a police officer who was 
interviewed by journalist for the Faro online newspaper, it is evident that “the hatred for gang 
members within the police and the desire for revenge has increased” and admitted to “hear 
conversations between agents who say: these sons of bitches, they should all be killed” (Valencia 
2016).  
In 2016 when these measures were implemented, the number of homicides in the nation 
resulted in 4,881, a reduction of homicides in comparison to 2015 when the number of homicides 
resulted in 6,071: that is, a reduction of 1,190 homicides in one year (PDDH 2017). Something 
that caught my attention during the research was that in 2016 the number of homicides of people 
related to gangs was 1,700 in comparison to 66 homicides of state agents (PDDH 2017). These 
statistics show that even though there was a reduction of homicides in the year when the 
measures were implemented, the deaths of gang members during ‘confrontations’ with the police 
was disproportionately higher than the deaths of police officers. Not surprisingly, these 
                                                 
37 Passionist Social Service 
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disproportions have only increased. By comparing 2015 and 2016, “it appears that the PNC is 
becoming increasingly lethal over time” (Valencia 2016). For example, in 2015, the PNC 
reported 676 confrontations with gang members. Out of these so-called confrontations, 359 
presumed gang members were killed at the hands of the FAES and PNC (Silva Ávalos 2017). 
Additionally, in 20 months between January 2015 and October 2016, the PNC recorded 1,074 
armed confrontations between the FAES/PNC and gang members. Out of these confrontations, 
the FAES and PNC injured 255 and killed 693 presumed gang members. By looking at these 
numbers, it is safe to infer many of those who were injured and killed included children/minors. 
Another realistic assumption is that all of those who were injured and assassinated by the 
PNC/FAES were men/boys (Valencia 2016). In other words, the violent assassinations 
committed by agents of the state are gendered because it primarily targets boys and men. In a 
later chapter, you will read how agents of the state violate the rights of girls and women – 
namely using sexual violence.  
In response to the ‘confrontations’ that have been reported by the PNC, the PNC Director 
Howard Cotto38 argues that “those confrontations occur when delinquents respond with gunfire 
to the officers’ attempts to arrest them… and so they die” (Valencia 2016). However, agents of 
the state shoot and riddle (presumed) gang members first whether these boys/men carry guns 
with them or not. Cotto’s assertion that the agents have the right to ‘self-defense’ in the face of 
threat contributes to a rhetoric that produces national impunity whereby state agents do not get 
convicted. In this form, state violence is produced in multiple ways. First, state agents are given 
the ‘green light’ to kill, and secondly, public officials promote institutional impunity whereby the 
relatives of those assassinated by state agents do not receive the justice they deserve. The 
                                                 
38 Trained in the U.S., Chile and Spain. 
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disproportionate deaths of (presumed) gang members compared to the state agents killed during 
‘confrontations’ paradoxically speaks highly about how state violence can be used to justify the 
reduction of another form of violence. I insist that a nation-state that used violence in the context 
of a peaceful democracy is not really a nation-state at peace. Thus, Salvadorans who live in a 
society that has declared a ‘war against gangs’ are faced to engage with the contradictions that 
arise in the military logic of a peaceful war.  
To continue to illustrate my point, the following examples showcase additional examples 
of when the PNC and FAES violated the rights of citizens. According to a report by the SPASS, 
on March 26, 2015, the National Civilian Police (PNC) reported an armed ‘confrontation’ with 
alleged gang members. The confrontation resulted in the death of 8 people of ages: 16, 17, 20, 
27, 29, 34, 34 and 40. Consequently, one of the witnesses was killed 19 days after the massacre, 
while Consuelo, mother and witness of the massacre, received death threats presumably from the 
Grupo de Reacción39––a branch of the FAES. This event came to be known as the San Blas 
Massacre, whereby according to El Faro journalists words like “massacre,” “mounting,” and 
“summary executions” best describe the event.  
While I do not seek to romanticize violence nor re-victimize or objectify the men and the 
woman who were assassinated on this day, the purpose of this illustration is to showcase the 
highly militaristic tactics used to kill them. Thus, the following description shows that the 
definitions of violence and peace are blurred through the militaristic rhetoric of civil security. 
Returning to the example of the San Blas Massacre, journalists documented the events that 
unfolded during the massacre (Valencia, Martínez & Valencia Caravantes, 2015). The massacre, 
which resulted in the death of two non-gang members and six gang members, started around 12 
                                                 
39 Reaction Group 
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midnight in the cantón (village) Matazano 2. It is important to highlight that those who were 
killed were not necessarily gang members. The fact that state agents can kill anyone whether 
they are in a gang or not should raise great concerns among civilians. One of the two non-gang 
members who were assassinated on this morning included Sonia Guerrero (16-year-old). Sonia is 
an example of how state violence has gendered expressions. To make it clear, a state agent 
placed a gun in Sonia’s mouth (as to potentially 
represent his penis) before pulling the trigger and 
killing her. The second non-gang member who was 
assassinated by state agents was Dennis (20-years-
old). Dennis was a young man and active church 
member who had nothing to do with the gang 
members and Sonia. Yet, the agents did not care 
who it was they were after, so they shot Denise in 
the right arm and in the head. It is important to 
highlight that prior to killing Dennis, they had 
arrived at the house where his family lived. 
While the agents threatened and even physically abused his family, Dennis was killed fifteen 
meters away from where his mom and three younger siblings were being questioned. So I ask, 
how is state’s indiscriminate violence against gang members and civilians creating a more 
peaceful society for the younger generation, as in the case of Dennis’ younger siblings who 
witnesses the massacre?  
Furthermore, in the following I will describe the deaths of the gang members who were 
assassinated on this morning. Ernesto (17-years-old) and José Antonio (27-years-old) were each 
Dennis and his uncle, Jesús Hernández. For several 
years, Dennis Alexander Martinez was a servant in the 
branch of the Baptist Biblical Tabernacle of the canton 
El Matazano 2, in San José Villanueva. This image was 
taken a few weeks before his death. Photo from 
Facebook Dennis Hernández. Source: Roberto Valencia, 
Óscar Martínez y Daniel Valencia Caravantes 
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shot at least twenty times. Ernesto received most of the shots in the face, thus destroying his face, 
while José Antonio received shots in his head, chest, and abdomen. Manuel (29-years-old) 
received thirteen shots, of which two were targeted at his head. Hugo (34-years-old) was shot 
nine times, and received an additional shot in the head. Mauricio (40-years-old) received four or 
five shots in his head and neck. Lastly, José Alfredo (34-years-old) was shot twice in the head, 
and received multiple shots in his chest and abdomen. The purpose of this description is not to 
re-victimize these men, but to shed light to the highly militarized and war-like method in which 
they were killed: by shooting them on their heads and chest. It is important to emphasize where 
the bullets hit because it is proof that the police have received military training, and no public 
official who is supposed to protect and serve citizens should undergone such training.  
In the same year, on August 15th, the FAES and PNC reported an armed ‘confrontation’ 
with alleged gang members. This confrontation resulted in the death of five presumed gang 
members. The youngest was 15 years old, while the oldest victim was 25. According to 
witnesses, the victims had already surrendered when they were shot by agents of the FAES and 
Grupo de Operaciones Policiales Especiales40. Four days after the massacre, Camila, who was a 
witness of the bloody event, was disappeared by state agents. In this way, not only did state 
agents used extra-summary killings as a method to promote peace, but they also forcibly 
disappeared a witness. Lastly, on February 8, 2016, the Reaction Group killed four people during 
an armed ‘confrontation.’ The youngest victim was 13 years old, followed by a 16-, 17-, and a 
23-year-old. One of the victims was not a member of a gang, proving the point that agents of the 
state kill indiscriminately and with impunity.  
                                                 
40 Group of Special Police Operations 
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The abuse of authority by the FAES and PNC, both outside and inside of prisons, is not 
always reported. So when reports are made, it is imperative to take a serious look at them. In 
2016, the PDDH investigated 556 denunciations against the National Police and Armed Forces. 
These denunciations included illegal detentions (113), poor treatment (317), intimidation (76), 
executions (27), threats (18), and torture (8). In fact, poor treatment, illegal detentions, 
intimidation and threats increased after April, when the extraordinary measures were 
implemented. Hence, the PDDH concludes that these measures “negatively impacted the human 
rights sphere of the people since the number of reports incremented during their 
implementation.” Moreover, the examples I presented above showcase that the extraordinary 
measures created the conditions in which massacres are once again acceptable in Salvadoran 
society in what it is supposed to be a postwar period. For this reason, I believe that the violence 
we see now in El Salvador – this so-called ‘war against gangs’ – is a war against civilians and 
should be contextualized in the era of a peaceful war.  
2017 
According to a journalist report by Beltrán Luna, on March 24, 2017, four police officers 
from the Sección Táctica Operativa (STO)41 shot and killed José Mauricio Salazar in El Zaite. 
José was a disabled, working-class man. Neighbors in the El Zaite trusted José because despite 
being deaf and mute, he was a hard worker, reliable, and reputable handyman in his community. 
Earlier on the day of his murder, it came to the police’s attention that a group of armed men were 
gathered in El Zaite. The police’s version, which has become the official story, stresses that 
when police arrived and tried to arrest them (the armed men), the men opened fired causing the 
                                                 
41 Tactical Operation Section 
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police to fire back at them in an attempt to “protect” themselves. 
But this version is far from the truth. The police did arrive at El 
Zaite when they spotted José who had just gotten off his work 
shift. According to witnesses, in a matter of minutes the police 
shot him in the face, killing José on the spot. José was an innocent 
man who should not have died at the hands of the police; and the 
police men who killed him know this, therefore they altered the 
crime scene and tampered evidence. When the police filed a 
report, they claimed to have found a 9mm Glock and bullet shells next to José’s dead body. 
However, there were several witnesses who claimed that José was carrying a drill - his work tool 
- not a gun. The witnesses also never heard the police make an arrest––implying that the agents 
never attempted to make an arrest, and instead just opened fire. Additionally, Salazar’s work tool 
was mysteriously disappeared. Only one of the four police officers accused of his death was 
convicted (Cidón Kiernan 2018). The other three continue to operate with impunity.  
José’s murder has not been the only case when police officers manipulate crime scenes. 
In fact, months before José’s death, on January 10, 2017, Daniel Alemán was unjustly arrested 
by the police and was accused of being in possession of illegal drugs. Months later, it was proven 
the police had lied and planted the drugs. Such illegal practices within the police was affirmed by 
a police officer who chose to remain anonymous in an interview with local journalists. 
Regarding the police’s illegal practices, he expressed, “and who does not have drugs or weapons 
in their closets? You know what they are used for. They are used to get out of trouble” (Beltrán 
Luna 2017). Agents also manipulated the crime scene the morning of the San Blas Massacre 
Portrait of José Salazar. Photo  
by: FACTUM/Jorge Beltrán 
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when Dennis’ bible mysteriously disappeared from his room42, making it appear as if he was a 
gang member, and not a religious young man who happened to be in the wrong place at the 
wrong time at the time of the massacre. Around the time of these killings, on May 5, 2017 Jaime 
Martínez, Director for the Academia Nacional de Seguridad Pública (ANSP)43, encouraged 
agents of the Tactical Operation Section to shoot without thinking about the press or human 
rights. To put it in his words, “Que no les tiemble la mano” (“don’t get shaky hands”) when 
pulling the trigger. His permission to shoot indiscriminately served as moral and institutional 
support to state agents, and gave them a ‘green light’ to continue to kill indiscriminately. These 
examples lead me to the heart of my thesis, the questions, how is military and police violence 
supposed to promote security and peace? And how does the nation-state define security, peace, 
and the ‘war against gangs’? As I have previously contested, state agents kill, disappear and 
torture anyone who they wish to kill, disappear and torture under the pretext of civilian security.  
Despite proof the police has planted evidence and killed innocent people, they continue to 
operate with impunity. On February 14, 2017, with the help of a civilian police informant, four 
agents of the FES committed the extrajudicial killing of 29-year-old Ivan Benjamín Carcamo 
Caballero known as “Bam Bam,” a member of the 18 ST gang. After the informant realized he 
put himself in a position where he could either be killed by gangs or the police, he turned himself 
in and claimed he had helped the FAES locate gang members and manipulate crime scenes on 
multiple occasions (Avelar & Martínez d’Aubuisson 2017). After turning himself in, this 
informant collaborated with journalists to infiltrate the PNC. During a three-month infiltration 
via the messaging application WhatsApp, tracker exposed illegal crimes committed by the PNC 
which included sexual abuse, extrajudicial killings, extortions, and the illegal buying, selling and 
                                                 
42 For more read, “La Policía masacró en la finca San Blas” by Valencia, Martínez and Valencia Caravantes (2015).  
43 National Academy of Public Security 
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trade of weapons (Avelar & d’Aubuisson 2017). Tracker was successful at obtaining such 
evidence because WhatsApp was the police’s avenue for communicating and organizing a 
clandestine ‘system of informal intelligence.’ As an illustration, on one occasion the police beat 
up a gang member and proceeded to kill him. After the killing, the policemen mounted evidence 
but officers on site realized there were visible irregularities in the crime scene. In response to 
these irregularities, an officer sends messages to the rest of the group to remind them to be smart 
about mounting crime scenes. The office stresses, “mates we must be careful with the photos we 
have to be smart about mounting scenes so that problems do not arise later” (Avelar & 
d’Aubuisson 2017).  
The agents responsible for Ivan’s aka Bam Bam’s death were detained a day after 
tracker’s testimony was published by Factum. Despite the evidence gathered through Factum, the 
informant, medical-forensic reports and experts consulted by Factum, the agents were let free 
with no charges three days after their detention (Factum 2017). The release of these agents after 
having committed serious crimes is not an isolated case. According to Agnes Callamard, United 
Nations Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, “in 2017, 
92.96% of all allegations of police/army killings were dismissed” (United Nations 2018), thus 
highlighting that impunity for state agents is an institutional problem that runs deep in El 
Salvador.  
Militarization, systematic killings, and impunity are not new phenomena in El Salvador. 
In fact, a dosage of all these have become an integral part in the construction of the Salvadoran 
identity and establishment of the nation-state. More recently, in the face of a polarized political 
party system, the death of gang members and presumed gang members have become an integral 
part of electoral politics. Within the context of the gang phenomenon, right-wing ARENA party 
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led punitive electoral campaigns against gangs to win votes in the early 2000s. Precisely, these 
campaigns culminated in the Mano Dura projects. However, this form of punitive politics has 
racist roots in El Salvador that can be traced back (but not exclusively) to the ethnocide of 
indigenous peasants in 1932. On this year, the Salvadoran military led by General Maximiliano 
Hernández Martínez killed at least 30,000 indigenous peasants in a period of seven months. 
What led to this ethnocide was the logic to punish peasants who had the potential to become 
sympathizers of communist ideals. In this scenario, punitivism becomes some sort of logic and 
reason to kill to restore security among the wealthy class. As formerly stated, decades before the 
modern punitive populism we see in El Salvador, the military has shaped the continuous 
edification of the Salvadoran nation-state whereby violence becomes a defining element for the 
maintenance of peace and security––one that has historically privileged the Salvadoran oligarchy 
and upper class. In other words, the weaving of the Salvadoran social fabric depends on the racist 
and classist use of state violence to achieve ‘peace’ whereby “the dead provide the raw materials 
for this politics; their bodies, their gender, their location, and their scars and mutilations are the 
basis for weaving” (Wright 2011) the Salvadoran national identity. In short, punitive militarism 
has been extremely violent, anti-indigenous and anti-communist; and modern-day punitive 
populism against gangs follows an anti-terrorist militaristic logic, which alike the other two, are 
Eurocentric articulations of the undesirables in Salvadoran society.   
The Social Psychology of State Violence: The Manufacture of Insecurity, Fear, and Anxiety  
Presently, while abuses committed by the FAES and PNC result in physical wounding, 
other forms of abuses result in chronic psychological wounding. It is precisely the social 
psychology of state violence an area of study that has been neglected by Salvadoran 
psychologists, which is the discipline I was brought up with during my college studies in the US. 
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The irony of the field of liberation psychology––which places an emphasizes on state violence––
lies in that the man who pioneered this field was murdered by members of the US-backed 
Salvadoran army in 1989. In an attempt to revitalize this analytic framework provided by 
liberation psychologist Ignacio Martín-Baró, I will showcase how state violence not only 
cripples bodies but the social psychology of civilians. During an informal cell-phone 
conversation I had with Sandra (pseudonym), she said she moved to a new neighborhood 
because the one where she and her family previously lived had become more insecure and 
dangerous. Not surprisingly, the insecurity was produced by the presence and patrolling of state 
agents who were increasingly arresting and threatening the people who lived there. His 10-year-
old son did not escape the gaze of the state agents. On multiple occasions, state agents were close 
to killing his 10-year-old son because he happened to live in that neighborhood. One day, 
following an altercation between the police and members from that neighborhood, Sandra’s 
mother asked the policemen why they arrest, threaten and treat the minors like criminals. The 
police asked her if her grandson was injured. Then, one of the policeman proceeded to say that if 
the kid was not physical hurt, then “que no joda” (told her to go fuck herself). Although this 
illustration plays a minor role in my thesis, it is a significant one for it showcases how some 
agents of the state define injury: one that is physical and not psychological. According to this 
logic, psychological trauma is non-existent even when children and young men are repeatedly 
exposed to near-death experiences and daily psychosocial stressors.  
Similarly, during my 2018 visit to El Salvador, I spoke to Manuel (pseudonym), a taxi 
driver whose son, a college student, was diagnosed with anxiety as a result of police harassment. 
Manuel tells me that one day the police violently entered his house to frisk his son because they 
had mistaken him for a gang member. “If it was not for me,” Manuel tells me, “the police would 
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have beat him or arrested him” (personal communication 2018). This type of police violence 
ricochets across families and communities, for not only did the son develop anxiety, but his mom 
and dad as well. The parents fear, as it is the case of many Salvadoran parents from working-
class background, that one day their children will be arrested, taken to prison, be seriously 
injured, or even killed by state agents. Another source of fear and anxiety is induced by the 
acknowledgement that the state will not prosecute the perpetrators, and justice will not be served. 
So can we really say that an anxious and fearful society, institutional impunity, and violence are 
elements in the construction of a secure and peaceful Salvadoran society?  
I was fortunate to have been the listener to the stories told by Sandra and Manuel; but 
stories like these often go unsaid. In the face of human rights violations committed by agents of 
the state, official reports do not accurately account for the number of abuses. That is, there are 
many more cases of state violence within the context of the gang phenomenon that go 
unreported. In the case of Sandra, a working-class woman who grew up in marginalized 
neighborhood, she does not know who to ask for help when her safety or that of her family are 
threatened by agents of the state. But even if she knew who to turn to for help, the code of 
silence that surrounds her day-to-day reality discourages her, and others like her, from reporting 
the abuses by the FAES and PNC in fear of retaliation from state agents. Women like Sandra are 
particularly vulnerable to violence. The violence that these girls and women encounter include 
structural violence (i.e. poverty) as well as violence that can come from either the gangs or state 
agents, including sexual violence.  
Extraordinary Measures as Permanent 
Since the extraordinary measures were implemented, the annual homicide rates have 
decreased. Given these statistics, the PDDH concluded that the extraordinary measures were 
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effective in the reduction of homicides. However, the statistics reported on extortion, injuries, 
disappearances, threats, rape and robberies stayed relatively the same, despite the 
implementation of the extraordinary measures. Further, the PDDH observed that there has been a 
rise in human rights violations committed by state agents since the implementation of this 
security project. These violations were committed both inside and outside of prisons, as I have 
previously presented. However, in a cultural context of fear and silence, it is important to note 
that out of the 1,200 denunciations against police officers and soldiers that were reported in 
2016, there are many more denunciations that were not made. In 2016, the University Institute of 
Public Opinion (IUDOP) found that 82.2% percent of surveyed participants believed that it is 
urgent to investigate cases of abuse committed by the National Civilian Police and military 
(Escalante Saracais 2016). But even though there is an urgency expressed among civilians to 
investigate cases of human rights abuses, it does not mean that people are reporting these 
violations, so many cases of abuse by state agents go unreported.  
 Despite the human rights violations committed by agents of the state since 2009, the state 
has continued to grow its repressive apparatus. By 2018, the PNC had four special forces that 
included the FES, Grupo de Operación Especial (GOPES)44, Sección Táctica Operativa (STO)45, 
and the Grupo de Reacción Policial (GRP)46. On February 14, Howard Augusto Cotto, Director 
for the PNC, announced the creation of a new task force called the Unidad Táctica Especializada 
Policial (UTEP)47, also known as “Jaguares” (Jaguars). This new task force is sort of the crème 
of the crème of the joint military-police groups for its members are selected from the FES and 
the GOPES – two police sections that have been accused of multiple extrajudicial killings. It is 
                                                 
44 Special Operation Group 
45 Tactical Operation Section 
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not clear how many police officers and soldiers have been assigned to comprise the Jaguars, but 
it is known that the FES and GOPES both largely consist of the FAES. Hence, the Jaguars might 
as well be a military task force assigned to operate in civil security matters. It is important to 
note that the United States has funded the Salvadoran police and has particularly provided 
financial support to the FES (Walsh, Arvanitidis, & Avelar 2018). Furthermore, Deputy Director 
General of the Police, César Baldemar Flores Murillo, announced that the United States has 
trained, equipped and armed jaguars with Windham rifles 7.62x39 (Avelar 2018). Additionally, 
César Ortega, the leader of Jaguars, expressed that “the US participates in training as well as 
providing equipment,” “The only thing that the US government does not supply is lethal 
equipment, the weapons and the ammunitions” (Walsh, Arvanitidis, & Avelar 2018). 
 
Figure 3: US-funded units: Who are the FES and Jaguars?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Civil Police (PNC) statements (Walsh, Arvanitidis, & Avelar 2018)  
 
 
The GRP underwent a process of disarticulation due to the human rights violations that 
GRP agents were accused of. Therefore, agents of the GRP were not (explicitly) selected to be a 
part of this newly formed police section called the Jaguars. On March 15, 2015, agents of the 
GRP were accused of committing the San Blas Massacre; however, these agents were let free by 
the General Prosecutor of the Republic shortly after because he could not identify who exactly, 
among these officers, killed Dennis. Furthermore, on December 28, 2017, an agent of the GRP 
  53 
forcibly disappeared fellow agent Carla Ayala after they had both attended a party that was held 
at the headquarters of the GRP. Fellow agent Juan José Castillo “wounded and deprived (Carla) 
of liberty” (Avelar 2018), and according to witnesses, Juan José screamed at Carla “this is what 
you wanted, right bitch?” (Andrade 2018) before wounding her inside one of the police cars he 
had access to on this night. This event is one of many unsolved cases that point to state agents as 
the perpetrators of the violence for reports suggest agents of the GRP could have arrested him, 
but did not. Moreover, according to Fiscal Chief Guadalupe Echeverria, the version provided by 
the GRP was blurry, “confusing and unlikely.” After attempts at investigating agent Castillo and 
others involved, the General Prosecutor of the Republic realized someone had infiltrated the case 
and alerted all agents under investigation (Avelar 2018), thus truncating the investigation. On 
September 6, 2018 Carla Ayala’s body was found in a cladestine crave in cantón Los Ríos, de 
San Francisco Javier. To this day, her murderer is still on the run. Despite the crimes committed 
by agents of the GRP, there was a loophole that permitted the incorporation of agents of the GRP 
and STO into the Jaguars. Particularly, in the event that agents of these two task forces are left 
without any tasks – as it was with the disarticulation of the GRP – then these agents can be 
incorporated into the Jaguars task force.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  54 
Figure 4: The composition of the Jaguars. Image titled, ‘from one thing to the same.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Avelar 2018 
  
By the time of this writing, many people have lost their lives at the hands of state agents, 
and many others have been physically and psychologically wounded by the state’s apparatuses of 
(in)security. Amidst these deaths and harm, on April 6, 2018 the Legislative Assembly approved 
a six-month extension of the Extraordinary Measures. So too on June 4, 2018 Mauricio Ramírez 
Landaverde, the Minister of Justice and Public Security, addressed the Security Commission of 
the Legislative Assembly with a document that seeks to reform the Penitentiary Law. In other 
words, this document proposed a legislature to make the extraordinary measures permanent 
inside prisons. Consecutively, on June 11, 2018 the Executive branch presented eleven reforms 
to the Penitentiary Law to the Legislative Assembly. These eleven reforms serve the same 
purpose as the formerly mentioned. For FESPAD, extending the extraordinary measures will 
imply to keep “an open door to permanent and systematic human rights violations.” FESPAD is 
one of many local human rights organizations that has paid attention and denounced the violence 
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perpetrated by state agents under these measures. But due to the severity of these violations, a 
look at state violence has transcended national boundaries and reached international organization 
like the United Nations. In fact, on February 5th, 2018, in the face of the institutional 
conversations about whether to make these measures permanent or not, the Special Rapporteur 
on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions of the United Nations, Agnes Callamard, 
expressed the following about the extraordinary measures, 
The implementation of extraordinary security measures has led to the prolonged 
detention of thousands of people, including preventive detention, in cruel and 
inhumane conditions. The security concerns alone do not explain the conditions I 
have witnessed, which leads me to conclude that such measures are implemented 
with the main purpose of dehumanizing detainees. Such measures must be stopped 
immediately. 
 
As I have presented in this thesis, the extraordinary measures systematically perpetuate 
human rights abuses both inside and outside of prisons. Under these measures, more people are 
being incarcerated and their rights are violated in a myriad of ways such as keeping prison 
conditions in unlivable conditions and conditions of contagion. By 2000, there were 7,800 in 
Salvadoran prisons, and by 2017, the number had increased to 38,700 inmates––that is, an 
average increase of 1,817 incarcerated people per year (FESPAD 2018) since 2000. With the 
passing of extraordinary measures as permanent, the prison population will increase and so will 
the human rights violations. But let’s continue the example of Landaverde who in 2018 
addressed the Security Commission of the Legislative Assembly with a document that seeks to 
reform the Penitentiary Law to make the extraordinary measures permanent inside prisons. The 
reforms forwarded by Landaverde petition to permanently incorporate the Penitentiary Law in 
the Extraordinary Measures. According to Landaverde, the policies that were implemented in 
prisons under the Extraordinary Measures gave favorable results, such as “reduction in the 
indexes of homicides and other crimes committed by orders emanating from the interior of the 
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centers” (Asamblea Legislativa 2018). That is, the basis of this proposal is the reduction of 
homicides rates since the measures were implemented in 2016. However, as you read in earlier 
sections of this chapter, the Human Rights Ombudsman Office stated that even though homicides 
rates decrease, other forms of crime and violence did not; meanwhile the reports on human rights 
abuses increased and have been attributed to the agents who were assigned to carry out these 
measures.  
Reforms to the Penitentiary Law  
The document forwarded by Landaverde petitions the creation of Prisons of Maximum 
Security designed for “highly dangerous” inmates, and gives the Director of Penitentiary Centers 
the executive power to decide the organization of prisons. The executive power that could be 
given to the head of the penitentiaries creates a safe haven for the violation of human rights of 
prisoners. To give an example, the director could have the executive power to decide how and 
when family visits are allowed and under what conditions. There is already talk that family visits 
will be restricted, while conjugal visits will no longer be allowed at all. In a like manner, in 
Maximum Security Prisons, which are in the proposal by Landaverde, family visits and conjugal 
visits will not be permitted. Additionally, when families can visit inmates the visit will be 
executed under the presence of a security guard and controlled through technological means, like 
on-site phones lines. One thing that caught my attention was the way in which Landaverde 
envisioned the functioning inside these prisons. That is, the prison reforms provided in this 
document mirror the US prison model whereby visitors and inmates communicate behind a glass 
and through a phone.  
Moreover, the reforms to the Penitentiary Law include that anyone (be it residential or 
commercial) who provides phone reception or Wi-Fi signal within a prohibited perimeter will be 
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subject for inspection (Asamblea Legislativa 2018). In theory, if the resident does not consent to 
an inspection, a judicial order will be granted within 24 hours to enter the premise. 
Consequently, the technology that is facilitating reception or Wi-Fi will be confiscated. If the 
same resident is caught for a second time, she or he will be given a penalty fee equivalent to a 
month’s income equal to the commerce and service sector, $304.17 (Ministerio de Trabajo y 
Previsión Social). By incurring the third offense, the resident will be given a penalty fee 
equivalent to twenty-month’s income equal to the commerce and service sector, $6,083.4. These 
fees will be enforced by the General Superintendent of Electricity and Telecommunications. In a 
country where the telecommunications system was privatized, the collaboration between the 
telecommunication system and carceral expansion becomes an interesting subject of inquiry.  
Additionally, under the proposed reform the Director of Penitentiary Centers will be 
granted executive power to immediately suspend without pay or fire employees whose functions 
imply a threat to the prison administration. On a rather neglected and unfinished section of the 
document, the reform encompasses a re-integration-oriented model, but it does not go further 
into how these policies will be implemented or what these educational projects look like. But 
according to this reform, inmates will participate in “activities of educational nature and of 
training work habits, seeking their re-adaptation and insertion in society and that are essential for 
an adequate coexistence” (Reforms to the Penitentiary Law, 2018). While some people will 
argue that the state is doing something to re-integrate formerly gang members into society, I 
insist that these efforts are minimal compared to the resources invested in the criminalization of 
the working-class sectors of Salvadoran society. In this manner, the punitive Right Hand of the 
state seeks to co-exist with the Left Hand of the state as if violence and peace can peacefully co-
exist. For this reason, I stress that the continuation of the extraordinary measures inside and 
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outside of prisons are an expression of violence in a nation-state that claims to be a peaceful 
democracy.  
International Reports  
Contradictions… occur at the interstate level. U.S. representatives… may criticize the deplorable 
human rights record of specific countries at the same time that the United States is providing arms, 
military aid, and training on terror techniques to the militaries and police officers of the same 
countries. Indeed, these contradictions have an iconic twist: often the granting of military aid is 
conditioned on respect for human rights.48 
 
The United Nations49, Amnesty International50, the Organization of American States’ Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights51, and the U.S. Department of State52 have written 
human rights reports condemning the human rights violations committed by the PNC and FAES. 
Some reports like the one written by Callamard, United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, urged the Salvadoran government to end the 
extraordinary measures immediately (Callamard 2018). Yet, the Salvadoran government has 
turned its cheek the other way and has not taken accountability for the abuse committed by its 
agents against gang members, presumed gang members, families and innocent people. These 
people have not only endured psychological trauma, torture, threats, but also sexual abuse 
(Avelar & Martínez d’Aubuisson 2017), yet the Salvadoran government has considered passing a 
legislature that will make the extraordinary measures permanent. As I have presented above, the 
main argument the Salvadoran government stands on is that the extraordinary measures have 
decreased homicide rates. In this way, the extraordinary measures have been used as a form of 
                                                 
48 See more on “When States Kill. Latin America, the U.S., and Technologies of Terror,” by Menjívar and 
Rodríguez (2005).  
49 For more read “Gobierno defiende las medidas extraordinarias cuestionadas por la ONU” by Bryan Avelar (2018).  
50 Amnesty International 2017-2018 Report on El Salvador 
51 IACHR Calls on El Salvador to Not Renew Extraordinary Measures in Detention Centers (2018).  
52 El Salvador 2017 Human Rights Report 
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punitive populism whereby the FMLN sought to win electoral votes in exchange of deploying 
joint police-military task forces and securitizing prisons and the streets. In the words of former 
vice president Oscar Ortíz,  
We have finished the year 2017 with very good results, when we started the extraordinary 
measures we started with 22.4 homicides a day, we closed 2017 with an average of 10.6 
homicides, we have achieved more than half of the homicide reduction in only two years 
after the implementation of the Extraordinary Measures.  
 
Additionally, according to the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, there were 6,657 
homicides in 2015 while homicides were reduced to 3,954 in 2017 (Ministerio de Justicia y 
Seguridad Pública 2018). Besides tighter control in prisons and the worsening of prison 
conditions, agents of the FAES and PNC have committed a variety of human rights violations––
extrajudicial killings being a popular one, especially by agents of the FES. As a matter of fact, 
the number of gang members and presumed gang members killed in confrontations is 
disproportionately higher than those of police officers or soldiers. According to the statistics 
presented in a journalist report, “in 2016, the Salvadoran PNC had a ratio of one officer killed for 
every 53 presumed gang members slain” (Valencia 2016). These deaths have been majority 
caused by shots in the heads, chest, and abdomen, which highlights the type of training the 
agents have had prior to killing these people. In other words, agents of the FAES and PNC aim to 
kill as if they were in a context of war.  
  As previously outlined, the extraordinary measures are part of a larger security strategy 
executed under the Sánchez-Cerén government (2014-2019). In fact, the extraordinary measures 
work hand in hand with the Five-Year Plan, the National Policy of Justice, Public Safety, and 
Coexistence, and the Plan for Safe El Salvador. Regarding the human rights violations 
committed under the Plan for Safe El Salvador, the UN High Commissioner for the Human 
Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein expressed that regardless of the crime and violence by gangs, 
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they do not deserve to be killed in the ways they have under these measures. He asserted that “all 
perpetrators of violence need to be held fully accountable for their actions through judicial 
mechanism. Victims on all sides deserve justice” (United Nations 2017). His statement implies 
that the state’s violence against gangs in the form of extrajudicial killings, mass incarceration, 
poor prison conditions, rape, and torture is not justified.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Made in the USA: Exporting Violence to the Pulgarcito de 
América 
____________________________________________________ 
 
U.S. Imperialism in Latin America and the School of the Assassins 
 
 Since the 1973 CIA-backed coup d’état against democratically elected president Salvador 
Allende, the United States aggressively put into action its Monroe Doctrine and Manifest Destiny 
inclinations toward Latin America. Consequently, there was an increase in U.S. economic, 
political and military advisees as well as U.S. funding, training, and advisory of Latin American 
intellectuals, politicians, and soldiers. One of the US institutions that played a key role in this 
time was the School of the Americas (SOA). The SOA was founded in 1946 in Panama. The 
school recruited Latin American soldiers to train them in counterrevolutionary military 
intelligence. Later, in 1984 the SOA opens in the state of Georgia. Below is a summary of Gils 
(2004) ethnographic account at the School of the Americas, which summarizes the imperialistic 
and interventionist doctrine being taught at this institution. After Gil’s account, I will present a 
brief discussion about the human rights violations committed by some of the School of the 
Americas graduates in El Salvador.  
 Although the quote is lengthy, it is descriptively rich enough to quote in its entirety: “The 
SOA, or the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation as the army now likes to call 
it, sits deep within Fort Benning, a sprawling army base on the southern edge of Columbus, 
Georgia. The institution bristles with imperialistic symbolism. Emblazoned on the School’s crest 
is the Spanish galleon on which Christopher Columbus conquered the Caribbean, and inscribed 
around the edge is the SOA motto, ‘One for all and all for one.’ This slogan comes from the 
Monroe Doctrine, James Monroe’s message to Congress in 1832 articulating the nascent 
  62 
imperial ambitions of the United States by seeking the exclusion of its European rivals from the 
Americas. The words continue to describe the imperial unity that the School seeks to build 
among the contemporary militaries of the Americas.” Gils elaborates that it is precisely at this 
school where Latin American soldiers are trained in counterinsurgency tactics, becoming the 
most notorious human rights violators in Latin America, particularly in El Salvador.   
 Gil argues that U.S. imperialism is the “intrusion of U.S. economic interests into other 
countries and extends to the multiple and varied practices of political, military, and cultural 
domination.” She continues, “military bases, weapons, and strategic alliances with local security 
forces constitute the cutting edge of the U.S. empire in which the [North] American state rules 
through the control of territory than through the penetration and manipulation of subordinate 
states that retain considerable political independence.” Lastly she asserts that “imperialism 
unfolds at the local level through a variety of power-laden relationships between unequal social 
actors. The security forces––militaries, paramilitaries, militarized police forces––constitute one 
of the most basic forms of imperial intrusion and control” which enforce laws and ideologies 
required to maintain dominant groups in power. Gils definition of imperialism is useful to 
articulate the social relations between the United States and Central America. That is, the United 
States has trained Central American soldiers, through the SOA, as a method for maintaining 
territorial control over Central American resources, economic, and political life as part of U.S.’s 
Manifest Destiny and Monroe Doctrine agendas amidst a neoliberal economic ascendance. In 
this sense, the United States conceives Central America as their ‘back-yard,’ thus justifying 
economic and political imperialist interventions over the region. For example, with the historic 
cascades of events such as the victory of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the monumental 
electoral victory of Marxist Chilean president Allende in 1970, the U.S. troops defeat in Vietnam 
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in 1975 and the Nicaraguan revolution in 1979, the United States feared that “communist” 
ideologies will continue to have a domino effect in Latin America, thus generating more 
revolutions, such as in the 1980s in El Salvador. Defining imperialism, then, allows us to name 
the geopolitical and economic policies that the United States has created in Latin America to 
maintain its ideological and militaristic hegemony in the region.  
U.S.-backed Salvadoran Military: The Puppets of the US Empire and Violence in El 
Salvador  
Moreover, Gil asserts that Latin American soldiers at the SOA receive various trainings. 
These trainings include techniques for waging small-scale strikes, counterterrorism activities, 
psychological operations, foreign internal defense, “unconventional” warfare (i.e. support of 
military and paramilitary operations against a standing government), and “such other activities as 
may be specified by the President or the Department of Defense” (Gill 2004). Notably in El 
Salvador, in 1961 José Alberto Medrano founded the Organización Democrática Nacionalista 
(ORDEN) (Democratic Nationalist Organization), the first counterinsurgent vigilante system in 
El Salvador. For some, ORDEN “the Spanish word for order, appears to have been a 
counterinsurgency effort inspired by the strong anti-Communism of the Kennedy 
Administration” (Lemoyne 1987). In fact, Medrano was advised by North Americans, and 
received training at the International Police Academy. Moreover, Medrano also founded 
ORDEN’s intelligence branch called ANSENAL53. 
The fact that SOA graduates like General Medrano have founded repressive apparatuses 
in El Salvador must tell us something about the purpose of the SOA: that is, the SOA has trained 
US puppets to do the dirty work of repression for the benefit of their Latin American economic 
                                                 
53 Angencia Nacional de Servicios Especiales de El Salvador (ANSENAL), formerly known as the Sistema Nacional 
de Inteligencia (SNI).  
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and political allies as well as for the ultimate geopolitical control of the United States over the 
region. In fact, Medrano was one SOA graduate who left a legacy of impunity and crimes against 
humanity. Other examples include Roberto D’Aubuisson, founder of the U.S.-backed dead 
squads, and Colonel Natividad de Jesús Cáceres Cabrera, second-in command of the U.S.-trained 
Atlacatl battalion that carried out the 1981 El Mozote Massacre, who were advised and trained in 
the United States at the School of the Americas (Gill 2004). Other figures such as José Antonio 
Castillo - head of intelligence for the Guardia Nacional (National Guard) - was also advised and 
trained in the United States. The foundations of the Salvadoran military, paramilitary and police 
institutions such in the case of the National Police, National Guard, Police of the Hacienda, 
ORDEN, ANSENAL, the Armed Forces and battalions followed a U.S.-sponsored anti-
communist and militaristic logic. From the beginning, these institutions became repressive state 
apparatuses which sought to control the population through fear and psychosocial terror, so much 
so that “in the early 1980s, there no longer appeared to be a single central point of political 
power or authority,” (Menjívar and Rodríguez 2005), thus generating more confusion, fear, and 
insecurity among civilians.  
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Figure 5: General José Alberto Medrano aka ‘Chele’, founder of ORDEN and ANSENAL  
 
Source: Foto de Archivo, El Salvador Times 
 
Figure 6: Roberto D’Aubuisson Arrieta, co-founder of Death Squads and right-wing ARENA 
party  
 
 
Source: IMS Vintage Photos  
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Figure 7: Colonel Natividad de Jesús Cáceres Cabrera, second-in command of the U.S.-trained 
Atlacatl battalion 
 
 
Source: Jeremy Bigwood  
 
 
Table 3: Military and Police Forces in El Salvador before 1980 
 
State Agency Number of Agents 
Municipal Police 
Customs Police 
Treasure Police 
National Police 
National Guard 
Regular Armed Forces 
Paramilitary Groups 
Total 
2,000 
2,000 
5,000 
5,000 
6,000 
16,000 
40,000 
76,000 
Source: Menjívar and Rodríguez (2005), and Instituto de Derechos Humanos (1988) 
 
By the 1970s, the coffee growing oligarchy (known as the ‘fourteen families54’) owned 
most of the land and wealth of El Salvador. In the same years, Salvadoran state agents were 
called to protect the economic interest of the oligarchy. In fact, between 1986 and 1988, “250 
Salvadoran officials were trained in the United States” (Costa 1999, 49). Consequently, these 
officials returned to El Salvador to repress any form of dissidence against the status quo. 
However, poverty and violence peaked during the 1970s, leading to a stronger discontent among 
working-class Salvadorans against the source of these problems. Under these circumstances, 
                                                 
54 Oligarchy consisted of 14 families: Hill, Dueñas, Regalado, Wright, Guirola, Sol, Daglio, De Sola, Quiñones, 
Llack, Borja, Garcia, Pireto, Salaverria and Meza Ayau. For more see, “Voices from El Salvador” by Mario 
Menendez Rodriguez. 
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state agents responded with systematic forced disappearances, tortures, sexual violence, 
massacres, day-light targeted killings, psychological warfare and other forms of 
counterrevolutionary repression.  
The Salvadoran Army Before the Civil War: A Look at the Beginnings of Salvadoran State 
Agents  
State violence was not new in El Salvador in the 1970s. As a matter of fact, in 1912 the 
Policía Nacional (National Police) and Guardia Nacional (National Guard) were created to 
appease dissatisfaction in the coffee fields. From the beginning, the police have abused their 
authority to ‘neutralize’ any potential threats to the status quo, namely the Salvadoran land-
owning oligarchy. Two decades later, the Policía de Hacienda (Police of the Hacienda) was 
created in 1933. The Police of the Hacienda eventually became a major institution of human 
rights violations during the Salvadoran civil war in the 1980s.  
Historically, the country’s political rulers had always come from the military, therefore 
their doctrine followed militaristic models too. In 193155, months after the democratic election of 
President Arturo Araujo, a coup d’état was carried out by General Maximiliano Hernández 
Martínez against Araujo. Consequently, General Martínez established himself as the new 
president; but beside the Salvadoran oligarchy, not everyone approved of his dictatorial regime. 
Then, on January of 1932 a large group of Salvadorans together with the Communist Party under 
                                                 
55 Within the context of institutional racism and militarized violence rose an Afrodescendant and indigenous woman 
to become the first woman in Latin America to run for office. In 1931, Prudencia Ayala, daughter of a single 
mother, ran for office at the time when Salvadoran women were not allowed to vote. Despite the sexist and racist 
ridiculed she endured, she actively spoke out against the United States’ involvement in Nicaragua, wrote pamphlets 
about a Central American union, and became a historical figure in the women’s suffrage movement. Prudencia did 
not win the elections, but has won the hearts of many who applaud her leadership, courage, and visionary politics. 
Retrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7Zqap0omZVA 
  68 
Farabundo Martí’s56 leadership rose up against the dictatorship of Maximiliano Hernandez 
Martinez (TeleSUR 2015). But on January 31st, Farabundo Martí was sentenced to death and 
killed on the following day by a firing squad. Simultaneously, between January and July of 1932, 
General Martínez – a fond follower of fascists Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini – ordered the 
ethnocide57 of over 30,000 indigenous people (Cárcamo 2012) in response to a series of peasant 
uprisings58 and to instill fear among land-owning indigenous peasants. As a result of this 
massacre, many indigenous people went into hiding, and a large part of the indigenous language 
and other cultural expressions were lost during this period. Furthermore, in 1933 General 
Maximiliano Martínez created the Restrictions and Limitations to Immigration Law. This law 
permitted the exile of Afrosalvadorans and prohibition of Afro-descendants, “Malays,” and 
“Gypsies” from entering the country (Esmahan 2016; La Prensa Grafica 2011). Even though 
General Martínez remained in power until 1944, the ties between the Salvadoran oligarchy and 
the United States have remained intact. Regarding the role of the United States in matters of civil 
security, "US assistance to the Salvadoran security forces began in the early 1960s” (Costa 
1999). Specifically, between 1962-1974, approximately 500 thousand policemen throughout the 
world, and 300 Salvadoran soldiers, received training and equipment from the United States. 
During the same period, El Salvador received more than 2 million dollars in arms and police 
equipment (ibid), foreshadowing the US-El Salvador relations in the years to come.  
 
 
 
                                                 
56 Farabundo Martí studied at the University of El Salvador, but decided to join the organization of the masses 
against Martínez’ military dictatorship. In 1925, Martí founded the Central American Communist Party. His legacy 
became imprinted after the naming of the Farabundo Martín National Liberation Front (FMLN).  
57 Historically known as the 1932 Massacre  
58 Indigenous people from Nahuizalco, Sonsonate, with the support of Afrosalvadorans from Atiquizaya and Turin, 
Ahuachapán, participated in the 1932 peasant uprising. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_xA6G0lnGg4&t=1476s 
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Figure 8: Arbishop Monseñor Oscar Arnulfo Romero arriving at Nuestra Señora de Lourdes for 
a pastoral visit shortly before his death 
  
 
Source: Association of Our Lady of Mount Carmel 
 
One of the major sources of US hegemony and Salvadoran oligarchic ruling was religion. 
For some, religious practices were kept separate from political life. One example of this was 
Monsignor Oscar Arnulfo Romero. Romero was a Salvadoran Archbishop, liberation theologist 
and pioneer in the politics of accompaniment. At first, Monsignor Romero was rather apathetic 
toward the suffering of the people at the hands of the army and police (Sobrino 2006); but at age 
54 he underwent a spiritual and political transformation. Monsignor Romero realized that he 
could no longer remain neutral in times of injustice after his friend, father Rutilio Grande was 
assassinated by US-trained soldiers in 1977. Consequently, Romero became a popular religious 
leader who denounced poverty and military violence as structural sins. Moreover, many of his 
religious followers sought spiritual refuge during his masses, homilies, and visits to remote parts 
of the country. Romero’s turn toward liberation theology made him a threat to the status quo. A 
day before his death, Romero gave a homily in which he condemned the violence sponsored by 
the military and police. The last words in this homily translate to, “In the name of God, in the 
name of this suffering people whose cries rise to heave more loudly each day, I implore you, I 
beg you, I order you in the name of God: Stop the repression!” But on March 24th of 1980, 
Roberto D’Aubuisson gave the order to assassin Monsignor Romero. The official shot Romero 
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right in the heart during mass. His death was profoundly symbolic for Salvadorans began to 
think, if they [army] killed him, then they can kill anyone. This reasonable logic re-affirmed the 
Salvadoran people that they could no longer achieve peace through peaceful and disorganized 
means, thus many joined the revolutionary forces to fight for justice, peace, and freedom from 
US economic and political hegemony.  
 
Figure 9: Monsignor Romero’s excerpt of his last homily  
 
“Hermanos, son de nuestro mismo pueblo, matan a sus mismos hermanos campesinos y ante 
una orden de matar que dé un hombre, debe de prevalecer la Ley de Dios que dice: no matar… 
Ningún soldado está obligado a obedecer una orden contra la Ley de Dios… Una ley inmoral, 
nadie tiene que cumplirla… Ya es tiempo de que recuperen su conciencia y que obedezcan antes 
a su conciencia que a la orden del pecado… La Iglesia, defensora de los derechos de Dios, de la 
Ley de Dios, de la dignidad humana, de la persona, no puede quedarse callada ante tanta 
abominación. Queremos que el Gobierno tome en serio que de nada sirven las reformas si van 
teñidas con tanta sangre… En nombre de Dios, pues, y en nombre de este sufrido pueblo cuyos 
lamentos suben hasta el cielo cada día más tumultuosos, les suplico, les ruego, les ordeno en 
nombre de Dios: ¡Cese la represión!”  
 
As a result of the extreme poverty and violence led by the US-backed Salvadoran 
oligarchy and military, extreme responses were born. Between the five revolutionary fronts59 and 
Romero’s assassination, Salvadorans had enough reasons to form a unified front that came to be 
known as the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional60. Under those circumstances, 
the United States funded and provided counterrevolutionary training to ‘neutralize’ the FMLN 
guerrillas and its sympathizers. In fact, during the 12-year armed conflict, the United States sent 
$6 billion (in addition to military equipment and training at the School of the Americas) to the 
Salvadoran government (Abrego 2014) to combat the FMLN and sympathizers. US military aid 
was overwhelming so much so that in 1991 the “system of Public Security that prevailed in El 
                                                 
59  There were five different left-wing guerrilla organizations: Fuerzas Populares de Liberación Farabundo Martí 
(FPL), Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), the Resistencia Nacional (RN), the Partido Comunista 
Salvadoreño (PCS) and the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos (PRTC).  
60 The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front was founded on October 10, 1980.  
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Salvador was strictly military and its main objective consisted of population control and political 
repression” (Costa 1999, 27). But simultaneously, the United States’s hegemony over El 
Salvador was weakening. US-based solidarity organizations such as the School of the Americas 
Watch, the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, and other transnational 
activist organizations were crucial in dismantling the institutional lies that the US had instilled in 
the North American people about its role in Central America. In the end, Washington and the 
Salvadoran military called for a cease of fire when they realized they could potentially loose 
against the FMLN. The US did not want another Vietnam; and so in 1992, the Peace Accords of 
Chapultepec were signed between the army and the FMLN guerrillas in Mexico.  
The Peace Accords: The Beginning of a Peaceful War  
To transition from a militaristic regime to one of ‘peace,’ the Peace Accords stated that 
the Salvadoran army would undergo a process of depuration and reduction of its officials. The 
Salvadoran army agreed to “purge its officials, and reduce its personnel by 50 percent, as well as 
to demobilize the immediate reaction infantry battalions… [which were] its offensive combat 
units” (Costa 1999, 97). In effect, “two of its three components (The National Guard and Policía 
de la Hacienda) were dissolved and the third (army) drastically limited its functions to the police 
field.” In other words, the Peace Accords delineated that armed state-sponsored institutions must 
be reduced significantly. Although the army did decrease the number of officials, they did not 
reduce its officials by 50 percent as it was agreed to. Moreover, the Peace Accords stated that the 
new Armed Forces of El Salvador were going to become an institution responsible for the 
defense of the state’s sovereignty, and would be overseen by the Ministry of Defense.  
But as I previously stated, the personnel were neither decreased as accorded nor the 
FAES responded exclusively to matters of national sovereignty. Yet, along with the so-called 
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depuration and the ‘decrease’ of military personnel came the creation of the National Civilian 
Police (PNC) who was assigned to promote "peace, tranquility, order and public security, both in 
urban and rural areas…. [and] it will be a new body, with new organization, new cadres, new 
mechanisms of information, training and new doctrine" (Chapter 2, 1. Peace Accords). That is, 
the new PNC was supposed to be created anew. However, the Peace Accords also stated that the 
PNC would be comprised of 20% of the FMLN militants, 20% of the National Police, and 60% 
of civilians. But, the PNC ended up being comprised of 52% National Police61, 36% civilians, 
and 12% FMLN (Costa 1999, 258). While the FAES was now overseen by the Ministry of 
Defense, the PNC was now overseen by the Ministry of Interior and Public Security62. This 
means that these two institutions would now serve different roles and would be overseen by two 
separate state institutions. The reason why it was decided to create new police separate from the 
military was because of the reported human rights abuses committed by officials who belonged 
to these army. In effect, the Peace Accords clearly stated that each state apparatus would serve 
different roles.  
Additionally, other factions of the police and army were also re-articulated. For example, 
the National Guard and Policía de la Hacienda became the Policía Militar (Military Police) and 
the Guardia de Fronteras (Border Guards), respectively. Yet, the Salvadoran army did not fully 
comply with its responsibilities. Regarding these two armed institutions, the Peace Accords 
stated that “the National Guard and the Police of the Hacienda will be suppressed [and will no 
longer serve as] bodies of public security. Its troops will be incorporated into the army” (Chapter 
1, 6, C). Yet, during the first three years of the PNC’s inception, more than 3,000 agents of the 
                                                 
61 Not to be confused with the National Civilian Police which was founded in 1992 during the Peace Accords. The 
National Police was a military apparatus that operated in the years of popular repression and during the civil war. 
62 In 2006, the ministry changed its name to Ministry of Justice and Public Security For more read, the History of the 
Ministerio de Justicia y Seguridad Pública http://www.seguridad.gob.sv/historia/ 
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National Guard and Police of the Hacienda joined the National Police – a formerly repressive 
institution – to collaborate in matters of civil security. In this way, the old regime refused to give 
up its institutional power, hence violating the Peace Accords. In fact, Costa asserts that the old 
military structure prevented, 
The suppression of the National Guard and the Police of the Treasury as public 
security bodies; continued with the successive strengthening of the National 
Police, the Police of the Treasury and the demobilized military units and 
culminated with the repeated reluctance to demobilize the National Civilian 
Police and several attempts to incorporate its members to the National Civilian 
Police. Another expression of the resistance to put an end to the old order was the 
efforts of civilian and military sectors to keep the military involved in public 
security functions…. The history of the first years of the National Civilian Police 
is the history of the resistance of the military – the main actors of the old regime – 
to change. 
 
This infiltration of the old system into the new was justified under the logic that there 
were new forms of delinquency being born in El Salvador, hence arguing for a need to deploy 
trained officials to combat postwar crimes. It was not until 1994 that the National Police – the 
paramilitary unit - was deinstitutionalized (Costa 1999, 149), but its agents continued to operate 
without impunity. The formation of the PNC posed a threat to the Armed Forces’ hegemony and 
economic privileges. For this reason, the Armed Forces made sure that its leadership remained 
incorporated in public security matters. Costa continues, 
 
The Armed Forces… sought to place in the key positions of the new institutions 
people who had their confidence [and] who had played a leading role in the old 
system, at the same time neutralizing the power that the FMLN might have... In 
this effort, they had the full support of the United States” (190). And “Since its 
deployment, all the most important command posts of the National Civil Police 
were occupied by personnel of military origin, including the divisions of Public 
Security, Criminal Investigation and Antinarcotics... [while] The FMLN 
personnel was marginalized. (211) 
 
The excerpt above shows some of several successful attempts that were made to infiltrate 
the PNC from its nascence (Costa 1999; Silva Ávalos 2015; Aguilar 2016). According to Costa 
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(1999), many of the soldiers who were incorporated into the PNC did not enter the police 
academy. In fact, since high-ranking officials were appointed and/or joined leadership positions 
in the newly formed PNC, they infiltrated their former officials into the police (Costa 1999), thus 
bypassing the law and proper training. As a result, these high-ranking officials created a pipeline 
whereby human rights abusers were now hired to promote public security. Visibly, this 
infiltration led to the same policing practices with the same human rights abusers, but now under 
a different name.  
In agreement with Costa, Jeannette Aguilar (2016) argues that there were repeated efforts 
to militarize the PNC since its inception. She states that “in the years that followed [the 
agreements], the successive top ranks in the military, in alliance with some ex-soldiers, were 
attentive to reconquer civil control spaces such as public security, alleging the emergence of new 
threats.” And to make matters worse, according to Héctor Silva Ávalos (2015) the infiltration of 
the old public security regime into the PNC facilitated “transnational organized crime, especially 
drug trafficking and money laundering organizations” which “penetrated the political party 
system and the social fabric” (3). In short, the army neither decreased its number of officials as 
accorded in the Peace Accords, nor did it respect the formation of the newly formed civilian 
police nor left their violent and illegal tendencies behind. Lastly, it is important to note that 
neither the FMLN nor the United Nations were consulted to make these decisions (ibid). For this 
reason, some would argue that the lack of consultation and representation of the FMLN and the 
United Nations in the so-called disarticulation of armed institutions led to the infiltration of US-
trained officials and human rights abusers into the newly formed national police.  
Moreover, the infiltration of violators of human rights abusers into the newly formed 
PNC not only created the conditions for a continuum of human rights violations, but also for 
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organized crime. Salvadoran presidents Calderon Sol (1994-1999) and Mauricio Funes (2009-
2014) have recognized the infiltration of organized crime in the PNC and government officials 
(Ávalos 2015). Yet, little has been done to get to the root of it. Instead, the creation of new 
threats, such as the MS 13 and Barrio 18 gangs, has been strategic in the masking of such crimes. 
Specifically, Silva Ávalos notes that anti-gang discourse has been strategic for the sustainability 
of organized crime for it distract attention from root causes to the symptoms. In fact, he argues, 
there has been an association between an “exclusive focus on public security” and the “practice 
of exclusion of references of organized crime from the official narrative” (16). For instance, the 
implementation of Heavy Hand policies in 2003 and 2004 coincided with the “transformation of 
one of the main gangs of dairy and people smugglers... [eventually] the general director who 
executed the Heavy Hand was expelled from the PNC and was identified of being an accomplice 
of a drug lord” (ibid). Furthermore, the Super Heavy Hand legislature was implemented around 
the time of “large public cases of deputies involved in money laundering and drug trafficking 
operations” (ibid) were exposed. Lastly, the 2012 gang truce coincided with the dissolvent of a 
strategic plan from the PNC’s agenda that sought to prosecute the Cartel Texis. The Texis cartel 
is a drug and money laundering gang that operates in the west of El Salvador (ibid). Further, the 
author argues that since the 1980s El Salvador has been key in drug trafficking at a global scale, 
and its role is just as important as the role of its neighboring countries, such as Guatemala and 
Honduras. As an illustration, in 2011 it was estimated that between 622,000 and 700,000 kilos of 
cocaine crossed the Central American region (Ávalos 2015). These numbers are supported by the 
ONU which asserted that “The fact that (El Salvador) shares borders with Honduras and 
Guatemala suggests that more cocaine passes through the country than what the government 
recognizes” (Ávalos 2015, 63). However, given the press’ overwhelming coverage on public 
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security and the heavy-handed political anti-gang discourses, it is easy sweep organized crime 
and violence under the rug. So it is not naïve to think El Salvador’s role in drug trafficking is 
minimal, for there is limited media coverage and public political discussions on these issues. But 
the fact of the matter is that organized crime is as present as gang-related violence; yet, state 
institutions seem to target more aggressively the latter over the former.  
Following the phenomenon of organized crime, one would think that gangs play an 
important role in drug trafficking, but they do not. Ávalos challenges this notion and argues that 
"both the State Department and the UN have concluded that gangs have a marginal relationship 
with drug trafficking in El Salvador... Washington has said: 'Salvadoran gangs ... have been 
related to street drug sales, but they do not tend to be an important component in the logistics 
chain of distribution of the posters... '” (79-80). Not surprisingly, “the Central American army 
has played a strategic role in trafficking of drugs” (ibid). In the case of El Salvador, Ávalos 
argues that the people in the Army who carried out operations in Ilopango, El Salvador during 
the eighties “ended up becoming leaders of organized crime groups during the following three 
decades" (68). Additionally, because El Salvador’s national currency is the dollar, it is 
imperative to recognize the role El Salvador may plan in money laundering in the region.  
Made in the USA: Tracing Human Rights Violations in El Salvador to U.S. Firearm 
Production 
 The following section deals with what I refer to as the ‘exporting’ of violence from the 
United States to El Salvador via U.S.-based firearms production. The Small Arms Survey 
identified at least 2,288 U.S.-based firearms producers between 1986 and 2010. These firearms 
were produced for the civilian, private security and law enforcement sectors. In the same years, 
106,079,100 weapons were produced in the United States (i.e. including miscellaneous and 
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exported firearms), that is 4.4 million weapons for each year between 1986 and 2010. Similarly, 
firearms import in the United States have been large with around 500,000 units in the 1980s to 
about 3.5 million units by 2010.  
The production of firearms can be narrowed down to four product categories: pistols, 
revolvers, rifles, and shotguns, “but since 2007 a number of firms [firearms licensees] have 
branched into other product segments” (Small Arms Survey 2013) such as grenade launchers and 
mortars. In the same period, the Small Arms Survey identified 2,228 U.S. firearms firms in the 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) record. Table 1 shows the number 
of firearms manufacturers between 1986-2010. As it is observed in the records, there are 332 
North American shotgun manufacturers, yet shotgun production is dominated by two top 
companies which are O.F. Mossberg/Maverick and Remington. Differently, Table 2 shows the 
total number of U.S. firearms manufacturers between the same period, only the data was 
assembled by product category. For instance, it can be observed that 26 firearms manufacturers 
produced all four product categories, while 1,692 focused on a single product category.  
Table 4: Number of U.S. firearms manufacturers, 1986-2010, by product category  
 
Product  No. of manufacturers 
between 1986-2010 
No. of manufacturers 
that dominate the 
market  
Characteristics 
Pistols 721 20 firms  Inter-rank mobility 
Revolvers 133 2 Ruger and Smith and 
Wesson 
Rifles 1,817 1 Not specified on article. 
Shotguns 332 2 O.F. 
Mossberg/Maverick and 
Remington 
Source: Small Arms Survey 2013  
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Table 5: Number of U.S. firearms manufacturers, 1986-2010 by number of product category  
 
Number of product categories 
(among pistols, revolvers, rifles, 
shotguns)  
Number of firms Percentage  
4 26 1.1 
3 67 2.9 
2 503 22.0 
1 1,692 74.0 
Total 2,288 100.0 
Source: Small Arms Survey 2013. Data compiled from ATF (1986-2010)  
 
Although it may be assumed that the number of U.S. firearms production are 100 percent 
accurate, no comprehensive study has been done to identify a more accurate analysis of U.S. 
firearms production due to data limitations; this includes imports, exports, and used weapons. 
Underreporting of firearms production is the primary reason why data is limited. While U.S. 
companies report some product manufacturing to the ATF, they do not accurately do so. This is 
possible through various ways in which underreporting happens, including (a) poor reporting 
compliance, (b) firms never report data to the ATF in time, or (c) ‘skip’ reporting, and (d) adopt 
‘censored’ reporting which allows them to produce firearms without reporting them to the ATF, 
especially during the first years of operation. Despite the accuracy in U.S. firearms productions, 
one thing is certain: the United States has produced more firearms between 1970 and 2010, than 
what they had produced toward the end of World War II. The high production of firearms in the 
United States is indicative of the role the United States plays in the international economy. While 
countries in Central America are agricultural producers and exporters, the United States plays a 
leading role in firearms production that are both consumed domestically, and internationally.  
Violence analysist contest that portable firearms and gun violence present the “most 
dramatic threat to public safety in Latin America and the Caribbean” (Stohl and Tuttle 2008). As 
a matter of fact, reports indicate that between 73,000 and 90,000 people are killed each year from 
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gunshots (ibid), placing gunshots as the leading cause of death among young and adult Latin 
Americans. So you may be wondering what the United States has to do with these statistics? The 
United States has supplied Latin American allies with “mass quantities of weapons through 
proxy arms dealers” (ibid). For example, the United States, through the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), supplied the counter-revolutionary Nicaraguan-contras with AK-47 shotguns (a 
Russian product) “in order to maintain official ‘deniability’ of its involvement in the conflicts” 
(ibid). However, U.S. supply of AK-47 to the Nicaraguan-contras had a ripple effect. The AK-
47s that were confiscated by the Sandinistas made their way through Honduras to reach the 
Salvadoran revolutionary movement of the FMLN which was in direct armed conflict with the 
US-trained Salvadoran soldiers.  
But even with the exposed case of US exports of AK-47s to Nicaragua, there is limited 
data as to how many and which firearms have been exported to Latin America. Like the 
inaccuracy of the exact quantities of U.S. firearms production, it is puzzling to assert an accurate 
number and types of weapons that Latin American countries import from the United States. Yet, 
the data that is available can shed light to the economy behind the legal market of firearms 
production and trade. According to Stohl and Tuttle (2008), “in 2005 Latin America legally 
imported at least $175 million worth of small arms and light weapons, as well as ammunition 
and spare parts. The United States was the main supplier to the region, exporting almost $50 
million worth of these weapons.” This is not to say all firearms are imported from the United 
States. In fact, there are Latin American manufacturers that produce firearms, but their 
production capacity is small in scope; which means that Latin American firearms producers are 
not able to meet their domestic demands, hence rely on U.S. imports to satisfy their domestic 
needs.  
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On the other hand, illegal arms trade in Latin America is large, yet difficult estimate. For 
example, Central America occupies an important corridor for illicit activities, such as arms trade. 
Stohl and Tuttle rely on anecdotal evidence to suggest that the United States sent large quantities 
of firearms through Central America bound to aid both Colombian guerrillas and paramilitaries. 
The armed conflict between the U.S.-backed Colombian military and the leftist guerrillas 
resulted in at least 218,094 deaths. While 19% of the victims were combatants, 81% of the 
victims were civilians (Centro de Memoria Histórica). Both the legal and illegal firearms 
production, imports, exports, and trade place gunshots as the leading cause of death among 
young and adult Latin Americans. Similarly, violence analysts suggest that illicit firearms enter 
Latin America through the U.S.-Mexico border. These small arms comprise a large portion of the 
guns that get used by Mexican drug cartels, costing the lives of 4,000 people in 18 months (Stohl 
and Tuttle 2008). In Honduras, since 2011 81% of homicides were committed with firearms 
(Small Arms Survey 2016). In fact, in 2014 and 2015 Honduras police submitted 1,645 tracing 
requests to the ATF to trace the source of the firearms. Not surprisingly, 44 percent of the guns 
came from the United States (Small Arms Survey 2016). Since Honduras, Guatemala and El 
Salvador are strategic regions for illegal gun trade, it is not a revelation that the majority of 
deaths in Honduras result from gunshots. Lastly, FESPAD has asserted that guns play a role in 
the continuum of violence in El Salvador. According to this government organization, more than 
60% of the violence and crime in El Salvador involve guns It is no surprise, then, that the illegal 
gun trade has made firearms accessible to civilians, gangs, groups who operate organized crime 
structures, and paramilitaries such as the Black Shadow––a clandestine anti-gang extermination 
group in El Salvador. As argued before, if the United States is one of the leading firearms 
productions in the world, and its firearms are imported in Latin America (or illegally traded), 
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then it is safe to argue that the United States’ firearms producers and allied North American 
politicians are ultimately responsible for the violent deaths that occur in Latin America.  
Central America does not fall behind these high statistics on gun violence and deaths. 
While violence analysists argue that Central America is one of the most violent regions in the 
world, I want to push forth an analysis that will allow us to de-center violence as the primary and 
defining characteristic of the Central American region. I want to make it clear that the primary 
manufacturers of such violence are North American companies who manufacture and profit from 
firearm production, exports, imports, and trades. That is, violence is made in the United States 
and exported to Central American countries. Particularly in Central America, the United States – 
through economic and political interventionist policies – has created the conditions for gun 
violence to exist. Indeed, in 2016 the Central American police and military received the largest 
U.S. aid since 2006. U.S. Congress approved more than $100 million to aid the Central 
American military, antinarcotic units and border security. Adam Isacson and Sarah Kinosian, 
journalists with the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), reported that the majority of 
these funds were destined to military and police training and equipment, including firearms. 
Furthermore, the funds were spent on the construction of police and military bases. Such funds 
U.S. funds are coming from both the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of 
Defense. While this financial aid is directly coming from these two departments, the funds are 
delivered by the United States Southern Command or Southcom. Not surprisingly, Southcom is 
the combat unit responsible for U.S. military operations in Latin America and the Caribbean.  
In El Salvador alone, the U.S. Special Forces and the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special 
Operations Command are responsible for training security Salvadoran security forces. Curiously, 
in 2013 the Salvadoran military unit – known as Comando Hacha (ax command) – received U.S. 
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training to serve as advisors to the police in Iraq and Afghanistan. Salvadoran military 
collaborations in Iraq are not new. In 2008, top U.S. military officers praised El Salvador for 
being the only Latin American country still providing troops to the U.S.-sponsored war in Iraq.63  
By 2013, Salvadoran soldiers spent eight weeks in the Joint Security Forces Assistant Course, 
administered by the 162nd Infantry Brigade and held at the Joint Readiness Training Center, in 
preparation for their deployment to Afghanistan.64 By 2018, both U.S.-sponsored wars in Iraq 
(2003-2011) and Afghanistan (2001-present) had costed the lives of at least 62,000 people; and 
only in Afghanistan roughly 116,000 have been wounded.65 What this means is that there is a 
military pipeline in El Salvador that recruits civilians into the armed forces, consequently 
training them on the use of firearms as well as indoctrinating in them interventionist and 
militaristic solutions to social conflicts and to achieve desired goals.  
As an illustration, the U.S.-backed Salvadoran military has had a historic record of 
human rights violations in its own territory. Gill (2004) maintains that the high-ranking 
perpetrators of large-scale massacres like the one in El Mozote village, were trained at the U.S. 
School of the Americas (SOA). While some may attribute El Mozote massacre as necessary in 
the combat of communist ideals in the western hemisphere, others think otherwise. In December 
1981, Salvadoran SOA graduate Colonel Natividad de Jesús Cáceres Cabrera was second in 
command of the U.S.-trained Atlacatl battalion that carried out what has become the “Worst 
Massacre in Modern Latin American History.”66 Salvadoran soldiers carried out a scorched-earth 
                                                 
63 Read more on “U.S. military chief thanks El Salvador for Iraq help” by Peter Cooney, REUTERS.  
64 Read more on “Salvadoran troops train at JRTC, deploy to Afghanistan” by Catrina Craig, U.S. Army official 
webpage.  
65 For more, read “Update on the Human Costs of War for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001 to mid-‐-2016” by Neta 
C. Crawford; “Iraq Death Toll Reaches 500,000 Since Start Of U.S.-Led Invasion, New Study Says” by 
Kerry Sheridan, Huffington Post.  
66 “Remembering El Mozote, the Worst Massacre in Modern Latin American History” by Sarah Esther Maslin, The 
Nation. 
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operation in which they beat the men, raped young girls, and killed anyone and everyone at sight. 
On this December, the Salvadoran army killed nearly 1,000 civilians. The point I am trying to 
make with this example is that the SOA had an influential role in El Mozote massacre. As a 
matter of fact, ten SOA graduates participated in El Mozote massacre. And so one thing is for 
certain: El Mozote massacre would not have happened if it were not for the U.S.’s imperialist 
tendencies or the military equipment, training, and funding to high-ranking Salvadoran military 
officers and soldiers.  
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CONCLUSION 
____________________________________________________ 
 
The Social Manufacturing of Terrorists and Punishment  
 
“A Country Full of Terrorists”  
-El Diario de Hoy, 8/28/2015 
 
“You ask what is the solution to gangs? Easy. Place all the gang members inside the Cuscatlán 
Stadium and give them guns to kill each other.”  
-Jaime67 
 
It is no coincidence the Salvadoran military and police are continuing to violate the 
human rights of civilians, only now under the justification of domestic and international security 
against the 21st century enemy: gangs. In 2015, the predominantly right-wing court68 passed the 
Special Law against Acts of Terrorism of El Salvador. The law was first introduced in 2006, and 
its main purpose was to establish a legal route by which to sentence anyone or any groups that 
carry out acts of ‘terrorism.’ And in 2015, this law included “its financing and related activities, 
and that by the manner of execution, means and methods employed, evidencing the intention to 
provoke states of alarm, fear or terror in the population, by imminently endangering or affecting 
the life or physical or mental integrity of people, material goods of significant consideration or 
importance, the democratic system or the security of the State or international peace” (Asamblea 
Legislativa, decree 108). In asserting so, the law established that “those who are part of terrorist 
organizations, in order to carry out any of the crimes contemplated in this Law, will be punished 
with imprisonment of eight to twelve years. The organizers, chiefs, leaders will be punished with 
imprisonment of ten to fifteen years” (ibid). The key concerns that arise from this law are the 
manufacturing of legal concepts of terrorism, the legality of punishment within the context of the 
                                                 
67 Pseudonym of university student. Retrieved from fieldnotes July 2015.  
68 La Sala de lo Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia 
  85 
prison-industrial complex, and the role the state plays in providing security to the non-terrorist 
‘citizens’ from this domestic threat. Soon after this law was implemented news outlets began to 
report gang-related news with statements such as, “A Country Full of Terrorists,” and “14 
convictions of 1,972 accusations for terrorism69.” In short, the terrorist logic gave state 
institutions, particularly state agents, the power to further dehumanize gang members and those 
who they perceive to be gang members, thus worsening the already complicated polarized 
psyches that dichotomize the state-gangs relations. Ultimately, this law provided a legal 
justification by which to declare a war on gangs.  
So what does the Law against Acts of Terrorism mean for people who do not belong to a 
gang? Salvadoran activists have argued that the anti-terrorist law, on the surface, appears to 
target and punish gangs. Yet when looked at it closely, this law has created the legal conditions 
by which anyone who displays any act of ‘terrorism’ (as defined by the law/state) will be labeled 
as terrorist, and thus punished as such. This implicates activist organizations and groups who 
have not always agreed with the ways in which Salvadoran politicians have met neoliberal 
demands. For example, under this law it becomes challenging for activists to challenge unjust 
laws implemented by the state, including the right-wing proposed legislatures to neoliberalize El 
Salvador (i.e. privatize water, privatize the mining industry). That is, peaceful actions such as 
occupying (or rather reclaiming) parks, streets and buildings are to be considered terrorist acts 
against the state. In this sense, the anti-terrorist law has implications for gangs, activists and the 
general non-elite population at large alike.  
 
 
                                                 
69 El Diario de Hoy 5/13/2016  
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The Normality of Abnormality: Conceptualizing A Peaceful War to Understand 
Militarized Policing and the War Against Gangs 
In this thesis, I have argued that the human rights violation committed by state agents, 
such as the National Civil Police (PNC) and the Armed Forces (FAES), against gang members–– 
and against those who these agents perceive to belong to a gang––can be conceptualized using 
Bourgois’ theory of Political violence. According to him, political violence is “directly and 
purposefully administered in the name of a political ideology, movement, or state such as the 
physical repression of dissent by the army or the police as well as its converse, popular armed 
struggle against a repressive regime” (2001). Using Bourgois’ conceptualization of political 
violence, I argued that the ideologies behind the remilitarization of public security and the 
human rights violations committed against gangs are in part due to a legacy of militarized 
thinking and most recently the legalization of gangs as terrorist groups through the passing of the 
right-wing legislature the Special Law against Acts of Terrorism of El Salvador in 2015. Not 
surprisingly, in 2016 the leftist Sánchez-Cerén government implemented the anti-gang policy 
known as extraordinary measures, waging a ‘war against gangs’ by the nation-state and enforced 
through the abuse of authority and physical repression by state agents. To contextualize the 
physical repression against gangs and presumed gang members, I explore the Peace Accords and 
its implications on militarization (and demilitarization).  
In 1992, the U.S.-backed Salvadoran military and the leftist guerillas signed the 
Chapultepec Peace Accords which put an end to a 12-year civil war that resulted in 75,000 
deaths, 9,000 forced disappearances and half a million internal displacements. Around 85% of 
the reports made by survivors of the civil war attributed the violence they experienced to state 
  87 
agents, paramilitary groups and death squads70. In a ‘postwar’ era, militarization of El Salvador 
has remained an institutional open wound. In 2008, the right-wing ARENA71 party signed a 
decree that established the participation of members of the Fuerza Armada de El Salvador 
(FAES) in civil security. In 2009, six months after the historic victory of the leftist Farabundo 
Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), the recently elected President Mauricio Funes (2009-
2014) signed a decree that established the continuation of joint police-military task forces in 
public security. The re-militarization of public security was made possible by a loophole in the 
Constitution. In fact, the Salvadoran constitution, which was re-written in 1992 as part of the 
Peace Accords, established that "at the discretion of the president, the Armed Forces could be 
disposed of exceptionally if the ordinary means for the maintenance of internal peace, tranquility 
and public insecurity have been exhausted (Art. 168, section 12, Constitution)" (Aguilar 2016, 
emphasis mine). Through this loophole, the Funes’ administration was able to remilitarize public 
security. But why? The answer is not so evident. Let’s consider the following. It is beyond doubt 
that the precedent ARENA administrations had already established an electoral system whereby 
promises of civil security became populist campaigns to win votes. But did the FMLN re-
militarize public security to win electoral votes? It is unclear. But what is clear is that under the 
Funes’ administration the military budget and funding increased in conjunction with more 
frequent reports of abuses of authority and human rights violations by the police and military. To 
reiterate, this institutional collaboration between the FAES and the PNC was justified under the 
constitutional loophole that the Armed Forces could be disposed of exceptionally if the ordinary 
                                                 
70 Roberto D'Aubuisson, School of the Americas (SOA) graduate, co-founded the dead squads. In 1981, he founded 
the right-wing ARENA party and became its first leader. After transnational activist and political mobilization, the 
SOA changed its name to the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Operation (WHINSEC). WHINSEC 
continues to train soldiers worldwide in counterinsurgency tactics which include torture, disappearances, and 
assassinations.  
71 Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (Nationalist Republican Alliance).  
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means for the maintenance of internal peace, tranquility and public insecurity have been 
exhausted, and re-stated differently in a 2009 executive legislation in the following terms: “the 
Armed Force will support the national police [in the event that] the resources and efforts of the 
police are insufficient to reduce crime.”72 In other words, the loophole in the 1992 constitution 
left an open door for the military to continue to operate as apparatuses of the state in matters of 
civil security. As previously stated in this thesis, the 1992 constitution – although signed by both 
FMLN guerrillas and the army – was heavily influenced by high-ranking military agents who 
sought to maintain their institutional privileges and power (Costa 1999).  
Despite the haunting legacy of a repressive Salvadoran military and the antagonistic 
history the military has had with revolutionary leftist groups, the FMLN government has relied 
on joint police-military task forces and physical repression against gangs and presumed gang 
members to ensure public security, and paradoxically, promote civil security and ‘peace’ in a 
postwar era. Precisely, my thesis argues that the fact that the FMLN has relied on the FAES to 
‘promote’ civil security is a contradiction. Therefore, my work stresses that this paradox speaks 
to the larger economic and societal structures that uphold militarization in El Salvador, mainly 
sponsored by U.S. imperialism in the Central American region and its Salvadoran puppets who 
continuously profit from structural violence such as poverty and violence among civilians. By 
Salvadoran puppets I mean right-wing politicians who have exacerbated poverty, made the 
country a safe haven for neoliberal projects, and have enriched themselves off the suffering of 
the poor. Among these are included the governments of Alfredo Cristiani (1989-1994), Armando 
Calderon Sol (1994-1999), Francisco Flores (1999-2004), and Antonio Saca (2004-2009). A 
Salvadoran investigative publishing company, Equipo Maíz (2016), found that all together for 
                                                 
72 See Decree No. 60 
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twenty years these governments have been responsible for at least 27 large-scale corruption acts, 
including theft in social enterprises. These acts of corruption have totaled in 4 thousand 024 
million US dollars. In a small country of a population of roughly 6 million people, 4 thousand 
024 million dollars would have drastically made a difference in people’s lives had the money and 
social enterprises not been taken away from the development of the country and the wellbeing of 
its citizens. Moreover, the Salvadoran puppets I am referring to include high-ranking military 
agents who have gained economic and political privileges through the financial support the 
United States has sent to El Salvador to ‘eradicate’ violence (Costa 1999). In other words, it 
appears as it poverty and violence––mainly gang-related violence––must remain a problem, 
because such a problem has resulted to be profitable among privileged Salvadorans as well as a 
reason for the United States to continue to intervene in El Salvador and the Central American 
region at large. All in all, it has been an unrealistic expectation to hope for the FMLN to 
completely reverse all the damage ARENA did to the Salvadoran economy. But a more realistic 
expectation was that the FMLN would not justify violence and militarized policing as means to 
achieve peace––for it is clear to me that its leadership are very well aware of the extent of human 
rights violations that can be committed under the logic of warfare in institutions like the PNC 
and FAES.  
Moreover, I argue that political violence––abuse of authority and repression by state 
agents against the Salvadoran poor, including gangs––must be contextualized in a postwar 
period, but not necessarily through the lens of a postwar peaceful democracy. In this way, a 
peaceful war follows a logic of warfare which is used to justify violent means to achieve peace in 
‘postwar’ times. One would think that a postwar country in a transition to peace becomes 
peaceful. However, “the very notion of a postwar era can have the effects of deflecting attention 
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from the existence of subtler forms of violence” (Benson et al. 2008 as qutd in Menjívar 2011), 
or not so-subtle forms of physical repression such as militarized police violence that the state 
strategically articulates both as war, and yet, a means to achieve peace. Furthermore, amidst 
political repression against gangs and presumed gang members, violence, in the eyes of some, is 
necessary for the dismantling of gang structures and ultimately to achieve a peaceful society. 
However, such normalization of abnormal solutions (i.e. violence) is part of a state of war in 
which the state refuses to articulate violent social dynamics as war-like, and thus become 
disguised as necessary (violent) means to achieve peace. And so, the problem with the use of 
violence in a ‘postwar’ era is that it reaps what it seeks to end: violence at the expense of peace. 
But in the end, one cannot fight violence with violent means. Otherwise, this violence would 
become a war in times of peace––hence, a peaceful war. Given the analyses provided in my 
thesis, this work contributes to scholarship in feminist studies, Central American Studies, 
political sociology, the sociology of post-traumatic stress, the psychology of post-traumatic 
stress, urban violence, and the social psychology of warfare. 
Towards Justice, Peace, and un Buen Vivir 
 
 The FMLN has made great advances for the people of El Salvador. Under the two 5-year 
long presidencies (2009-2019), the leftist leadership implemented several social programs and 
legislatures that sought to promote un buen vivir among sectors of society that were affected by 
wars, corruption, and neoliberal projects such as the dollarization and privatization of electricity. 
Fortunately, the 2009 historic victory of the FMLN coincided with other Latin American 
governments that pioneered the socialism of the 21st century73. Un Buen Vivir or Sumak 
Kawsay, was a leading principle adopted by the Latin American left in the 2000s. According to 
                                                 
73 Some included Fidel Castro in Cuba, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Rafael Correa in Ecuador, Evo Morales in 
Bolivia, Néstor and Cristina Kirchner in Argentina, and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brasil.  
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Cabnal (2010) Sumak comes from the Ecuadorian Quichua and expresses life with integrity. 
Kawsay comes from the Bolivian Aymara and introduces the community element. Together, 
Sumak Kawsay express un buen convivir o un buen vivir (a people living with integrity). El 
Salvador joined this political force and adapted un buen vivir into their agenda. Some of the 
invaluable programs in the FMLN’s agenda included the daily glass of milk to young students in 
public schools, the creation of women and youth centers such as Ciudad Mujer and Instituto de la 
Juventud (INJUVE), as well as small pensions to the elderly and support to farmers.  
 However, the left hand of the state (social programs) was met with the right hand of the 
state (punitive policies). Here is where the contradiction lies: one cannot promote a good living 
for some and physical repression for others––unless the latter are perceived and treated as non-
citizens, and hence rationalized as undeserving of social welfare and inclusion in which case 
violence against them becomes justified and exceptional. As a leftist sympathizer, I was 
profoundly conflicted at the punitive and repressive stance the FMLN took against gangs. Did 
not the FMLN fight against militarized repression during the civil war? Does not the FMLN 
want peace? The answer is not so simple. In conversing with Armenta García––a public school 
teacher under the Del Valley School District, a predominantly Latinx high school located seven 
miles to the East of Austin, he eloquently expressed a similar enigma, “How did they [the 
FMLN] become the same repressive presence that they were supposed to replace?” (Armenta 
García 2019). As previously stated, the puzzle is clear but the answer is not so simple.  
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While some leftist politicians have condemned gangs and even justified violence against 
gangs (I could name a few names off top of my head whom I shared personal communication 
with regarding this topic), some others, like former FMLN militant Raúl Mijango, have proposed 
peaceful means to eradicate gangs without the need to stage a state-sponsored war against gangs. 
In 2012, Mijango became one of the facilitators in a dialogue and cease of fire between the two 
rival gangs in El Salvador. Namely, the MS-13 and the Barrio 18. In this dialogue, the leadership 
(“voceros”) from both gangs came to the realization that they are killing their own people, and 
wanted to put an end to this; so they made a call to politicians, Salvadoran society and 
international organizations to support them as they sought to put an end to homicides and other 
gang-related activities. To do so they proposed 
a list of demands and alternatives (see table 6). 
During this time, homicide rates decreased from 
fourteen a day to 5.5 daily, but fewer data is 
available on the prevalence of gang-sponsored 
extortions and is unknown regarding rapes 
during this time.  
Such drastic decrease in homicides 
shows that these types of killings can be 
reduced if the gangs involved in these 
actions decided to stop the killings. A strong 
statement was made. Unfortunately, such 
dialogue––which rapidly gained notoriety 
as a ‘truce’––did not work (perhaps because peace is not profitable?). In other words, the 
(Top and bottom) Mosignor Fabio Colindres 
blessing pandilleros. 
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dialogue did not work because the state did not agree on a peace treaty with gangs, and instead 
the political repression against them not only continued but intensified, as seen with the 
extraordinary measures. But do not get me wrong, I am not saying gangs should be excused for 
the violence they reproduce and create. I am aware gangs are violent criminal organizations that 
have transcended the Salvadoran national border and have won territory and notoriety all over 
the world. But we already know this. So I am presenting an argument that is often placed at the 
margins. Thus, what I am saying is that gangs are not the source of violence, but a symptom of 
structural poverty, violence and U.S. imperialist intervention in the region––which can be 
contextualized within a legacy of colonialism. In the end, the dialogue lost the little support it 
had received, and Mijango was jailed for ‘facilitating an illegal act’ (Dudley 2018). Future 
research may shed light on the religious actors such as Monsignor Fabio Colindres who 
facilitated this dialogue, and the role liberation theology plays in the neoliberal era. In the end, it 
appeared as if the state ‘abandoned’ gang members and instead gangs were met with repression 
in the consecutive years.  
Presently, the FMLN is the only political party that is committed to advancing social 
programs and legislatures that benefit historically marginalized communities over transnational 
corporations and neoliberal projects. However, it is also an entity that has yet to challenge their 
own personal and political biases toward gangs. My role as a Salvadoran diasporic youth in the 
United States is to continue to hertoricize the birth of gangs, problematize repression by state 
agents, propose peaceful alternatives to the gang phenomenon, and encourage the FMLN 
militancy to seriously hear us out –– the dissidents – about our analyses on public security and 
gangs.  
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In writing this thesis, I acknowledge the political repercussions that can come from 
proposing peaceful alternatives and solutions to the gang phenomenon in El Salvador, and in the 
Central American region at large. In El Salvador, one can be accused of collaborating with 
‘terrorists’ for the simple act of proposing more humanistic alternatives than political repression. 
This thesis may in fact be the type of analysis that could be labeled as dissident. And it is. This 
thesis reflects a dissident voice because it proposes that one effective way to decrease gang-
related crimes and violence is neither through militarized policing nor political violence, but 
through the eradication of systematic poverty and violence from its foundations via feminist anti-
racist projects. In other words, the killings of and between gang members can be theorized as 
genocide in the so-called ‘global south.’ Therefore, a feminist anti-racist framework can provide 
more complex articulations of gang-related violence and state repression that transcend the 
current exocitized theorizations of urban violence in El Salvador.  
As I get closer to the end of this writing, I write my closing statement fearing that my 
readers will perceive me to be a romantic or an idealist. And that is okay. It is okay to be an 
intellectual and have dreams for a better future, otherwise, why do we study the issues that 
matter to us? With that being said, I believe another society is possible, but one cannot envision a 
better society without the inclusion and participation of the people who have been labeled as 
undesirable and undeserving of life, dignity and integrity in El Salvador, and this includes gang 
members. My dream is that one day gang members will become agents of personal healing and 
empowerment as well as political agents of change. Namely, I dream that with the support of 
society they will examine their own toxic masculinity and will challenge the dehumanizing 
ruling of the Salvadoran elite and US-sponsored neoliberal projects. Lastly, I hope one day we 
realize it is best to move forward and not backward. A backward move has already been made 
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and it consisted in the re-militarization of the police and public security in a postwar era. This 
move is not a peaceful mean for a peaceful end; instead it only reaps what it seeks to eradicate: 
violence.   
Table 6: Some of the demands and alternatives proposed by members of the MS-13 and Barrio 
18 during the gang truce 
 
List of demands List of Alternatives 
➢ Stop the physical attack by the Armed 
Forces of El Salvador (FAES) during 
detention processes 
➢ Stop the shooting by the FAES when 
gang members run when they notice 
the agents’ presence 
➢ That the prison system in El Salvador 
stops being a violator of human rights 
-Give access to necessary materials to remove 
graffiti allusive to gangs (i.e. paintings and 
brushes) 
-Form spaces where veterans and non-active 
members share their testimonies to the youth 
since they do not want the same life for their 
children  
-Municipalities Sanctuaries / Prevention Plan 
 
Where gangs promise to: 
a. Promote no aggression between gang 
members 
b. Reduce homicides, extortions, robberies, 
kidnappings 
c. Surrender their weapons voluntarily 
 
Police promises to: 
d. Not criminalize gang members or their 
families 
 
The State promises to: 
e. Give access to employment opportunities 
for young people who come from 
economically marginalized and socially 
excluded communities 
f. Integrate gang members into community 
groups for local development 
g. Give access to mental health 
h. Promote cultural education initiatives in 
schools 
i. Install a criminological observatory 
integrated by the residents of the colonies 
j. Promote sports, culture, arts and recreation 
Source: Mijango 2013 
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Centroamérica y El Caribe. San Salvador, El Salvador: Asociación Equipo Maíz. 
 
Amnesty International. (2018). EL SALVADOR 2017/2018, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/americas/el-salvador/report-el-salvador/ 
 
Amnesty International. (1996). EL SALVADOR: The spectre of death squads. Amnesty  
International, 
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/168000/amr290151996en.pdf 
 
Andrade, T. (2018). Así fue como los agentes del GRP ignoraron el balazo que le dieron a Carla  
Ayala y permitieron que su agresor escapara. El Salvador Times,  
https://www.elsalvadortimes.com/articulo/sucesos/asi-fue-agentes-grp-ignoraron-balazo-
dieron-carla-ayala-permitieron-agresor-escapara/20180604212854042553.html 
 
Armenta García, H. Personal communication. April 14, 2019.  
 
Asamblea Legislativa de la República de El Salvador. (2018). Reformas a la Ley  
Penitenciaria. San Salvador, El Salvador: Legislative Palace,  
https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/sites/default/files/documents/correspondencia/34185A0C-
6566-44BF-A487-68C704653CCD.pdf 
 
Asamblea Legislativa de la República de El Salvador. Ley Especial Contra Actos de Terrorismo,  
https://www.asamblea.gob.sv/decretos/details/477 
 
Avelar, B. (2018). Gobierno defiende las medidas extraordinarias cuestionadas por la ONU.  
Revista Factum, http://revistafactum.com/gobierno-medidas-onu/ 
 
Avelar, B. (2018). La policía maquilla sus unidades élite involucradas en delitos. Revista  
Factum, http://revistafactum.com/la-policia-maquilla-sus-unidades-elite-involucradas-en-
delitos/ 
 
Avelar, B. (2017). El infierno de las bartolinas policiales. Revista Factum, 
http://revistafactum.com/el-infierno-de-las-bartolinas-policiales/ 
 
Avelar, B. & Martínez d’Aubuisson, J. (2017). En la intimidad del escuadrón de la muerte de la  
Policía. Revista Factum, http://revistafactum.com/en-la-intimidad-del-escuadron-de-la-
muerte-de-la-policia/  
 
 
  97 
Bishop, Marlon. (2016). Central American Gangs, Made in LA. Latino USA, 
http://latinousa.org/2016/01/22/central-american-gangs-made-in-la 
 
Beltrán Luna, J. (2017). A Chepe también lo mato la Policía. Revista Factum, 
http://revistafactum.com/a-chepe-tambien-lo-mato-la-policia/ 
 
Bourgois, Phillipe. (2001). The power of violence in war and peace: Post-Cold War lessons from  
El Salvador. SAGE Publications. Vol 2(1): 5-34. 
 
Brauer, J. (2013). The US Firearms Industry: Production and Supply. Small Arms Survey.  
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies. Geneva. 
 
Brigida, A. C. & Gies, H. (2018). ‘Our country is not a safe place’: why Salvadorans will still  
head for the US. The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/24/salvadorans-deported-from-us-facing-
violence-fleeing-poverty 
 
Brigida, A.C. (2015). How one man escaped El Salvador’s cycle of violence. PRI,  
https://www.pri.org/stories/2015-08-04/how-one-man-escaped-el-salvador-s-cycle-
violence 
Cabnal, Lorena. (2010). Acercamiento a la construcción del pensamiento epistémico de las  
mujeres indígenas feministas comunitarias de Abya Yala. “Feminismos diversos: el 
feminismo comunitario” edited by ACSUR. ACUSAR-La Segovia, 
https://porunavidavivible.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/feminismos-comunitario-lorena-
cabnal.pdf 
Callamard, A. (2018). El Salvador End of Mission Statement. United Nations,   
https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22634&LangI
D=E 
 
Cárcamo, J. (2012). Since Farabundo Martí: An Analysis of the Challenges and Revolutionary  
Advances of Salvadoran Youth in the Student Movement. University of California, Los  
Angeles. Senior Honors Thesis.  
 
Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica. (2012). Estadísticas del conflicto armado en Colombia,  
http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/micrositios/informeGeneral/estadisticas.ht
ml 
 
Cidón Kiernan, M. (2018). La policía manipuló la escena del crimen de Chepe,  
Retrieved from: http://revistafactum.com/la-policia-manipulo-la-escena-del-crimen-de-
chepe/ 
 
Cidón Kiernan, M. (2017). La Fuerza Armada desapareció a tres jóvenes en tiempos de paz.  
Revista Factum, http://revistafactum.com/la-fuerza-armada-desaparecio-a-tres-jovenes-
en-tiempos-de-paz/  
  98 
Cidón Kiernan, M. (2017). “La población habla de que la Policía se ha convertido en una nueva  
pandilla porque no hay confianza.” Revista Factum, http://revistafactum.com/la-policia-
se-ha-convertido-en-una-nueva-pandilla-porque-no-hay-confianza/ 
 
ContraPunto TV El Salvador. Voces contra la militarización de la capital. ContraPunto TV El  
Salvador. YouTube. Sept. 25, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EBrVxg7YK9Q 
 
Cooney, P. (2008). U.S. military chief thanks El Salvador for Iraq help,  
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-salvador-usa-iraq/u-s-military-chief-thanks-el-
salvador-for-iraq-help-idUSN1833087820080119 
 
Costa, G. (1999). “La Policía Nacional Civil de El Salvador (1990-1997).” San Salvador, El  
Salvador: UCA Editores.  
 
Costanzo, M.; Gerrity, E.; Lykes, B. (2007). Psychologists and the Use of Torture in  
Interrogations. Analyses of Social Issues.  
Crawford, N.C. (2016). Update on the Human Costs of War for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001  
to mid-‐-2016, 
https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2016/War%20in%20Afghani
stan%20and%20Pakistan%20UPDATE_FINAL_corrected%20date.pdf 
 
Craig, K. (2013). Salvadoran troops train at JRTC, deploy to Afghanistan,  
https://www.army.mil/article/107259/salvadoran_troops_train_at_jrtc_deploy_to_afghani
stan 
 
Davis, A. Y. (2003). Are Prisons Obsolete? Toronto, Canada: Seven Stories Press.  
 
Decree No. 60. Executive Branch of the Republic of El Salvador,  
http://www.jurisprudencia.gob.sv/DocumentosBoveda/D/2/2000-
2009/2009/10/8877E.PDF 
 
Dudley, S. (2018). El Salvador’s Jailed Gang Mediator: ‘I feel defrauded ,’ InSight Crime,  
https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/el-salvadors-jailed-gang-mediator-feel-
defrauded/ 
 
El Diario de Hoy. (2016). 14 condenas de 1,972 acusaciones por terrorismo. El Diario de Hoy,  
http://www.eldiariodehoy.com/noticias/nacional/16610/14-condenas-de-1972-acusaciones-por-
terrorismo/ 
 
Escalante Saracais, Manuel E. (2016). Seguimiento de Medidas Extraordinarias en Seguridad  
Pública – El Salvador, 2016. Universidad Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas.” San 
Salvador, El Salvador. PowerPoint presentation. 
 
 
 
  99 
Esmahan, E. (2016). Salarrué: El negro Punce… y el mito racista. El Salvador.com, 
 https://www.elsalvador.com/opinion/editoriales/190552/salarrue-el-negro-punce-y-el-
mito-racista/ 
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